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...Summary 
The main objective of this study is to show how various micro-economic direct/indirect effects 
(e.g. deadweight loss, leverage effects, etc.) and selected general equilibrium effects (e.g. substitution 
and displacement effects) of EU RD programmes can be calculated using recently developed advanced 
econometric semi-parametric evaluation methodologies. Answers to EU Common Evaluation Questions 
(CEQ) regarding the effects of an RD programme on programme beneficiaries at farm level (including 
deadweight loss and leverage effects) are provided by comparing changes in specific result indicators 
collected at a farm level (e.g. profits, employment, gross-value added, labour productivity, etc.) in the 
group of programme beneficiaries with an appropriately selected control group (counterfactual analysis - 
based on matching). Direct programme effects are calculated on the basis of Average Treatment on Treated 
(ATT) indicators (for programme beneficiaries), Average Treatment Effects on Non-Treated (ATNT) indicators 
(for programme non-beneficiaries) and Average Treatment Effects (for both groups) using a combination 
of propensity score matching (PSM) and difference in differences (DID) methods. A modified propensity 
score and difference in differences methodology (modified PSM-DID) is applied to derive various general 
equilibrium effects (e.g. substitution effects). The empirical analysis is focused on evaluation of effects 
of the SAPARD programme in Slovakia (years 2002-2005) and the Agrarinvestitionsförderungsprogramm 
(AFP) in Schleswig Holstein, Germany (2000-2006) using micro-economic data (balanced panels) of 
bookkeeping farms (including programme participants and non-participants) in respective countries.
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1.1.  EU approach to the evaluation of 
the RD programmes
In recent years the evaluation of EU Member 
States’ co-founded programmes was assigned 
particular importance. The administrative reform 
of the European Community (Agenda 2000) 
confirmed the significance of the monitoring and 
evaluation components, and extended periodic 
evaluation to all EU policies (Toulemonde et 
al., 2002). Meanwhile, evaluation has been 
recognized as a crucial component of policy 
development and became an integral part of EU 
programming at all levels, e.g. EU, national, and 
territorial, etc. (Vanhove, 1999; Ederveen, 2003; 
EC, 1999, 2002a, 2002b).
Evaluation of specific policy interventions 
can be undertaken for many reasons, for example: 
to assess a programme’s impact, to improve 
programme management and administration 
(e.g. identify necessary improvements in the 
delivery of interventions) or to meet accountability 
requirements of funding institutions (Rossi, 
Freeman, 1993).
According to the EU definition, programme 
evaluation is a process that culminates in a 
judgement (assessment) of policy interventions 
according to their results, impacts and the needs 
they aim to satisfy1. In the case of structural 
and rural development (RD) programmes, EU 
regulations distinguish between ex-ante, mid-
term, ex-post and ongoing evaluations. Ex-
ante evaluations aim to optimize budgetary 
resources’ allocation and improve the quality of 
programming by answering the question: “what 
impacts can be expected from a newly designed 
policy or programme?” Meanwhile the main 
1 See: Evaluating EU activities – A practical guide for the 
Commission Services, DG Budget, July 2004.
purpose of mid-term and ex-post evaluations of 
EU programmes is to learn about:
•	 The programme’s effectiveness, i.e. the 
degree to which a programme produced 
the desired outcome (an assessment of a 
programme’s effectiveness implies a pre-
definition of operationally defined objectives 
and criteria of its achievement), and 
•	 Programme efficiency, i.e. the degree to 
which overall programme benefits relate to 
its costs. 
In order to facilitate and improve 
the quality of evaluations, the EC issued 
several evaluation guidelines2 laying out 
the principles and rules of the evaluation 
process. These, until now, serve as the main 
reference for evaluation of rural development 
programmes in all EU member states and 
EU accessing countries. The core element of 
the EC evaluation framework are Common 
Evaluation Questions (CEQ) (pre-defined by 
the EC) and programme-specific questions 
(to be defined by national programme 
authorities), both to be answered by external 
programme evaluators. Answering the EC 
common evaluation questions requires the 
use of the “intervention logic” concept pre-
defined by the EC, i.e. differentiating between 
programme inputs, outputs, results, and 
2 Respective guidelines include: Evaluating EU activities – A 
practical guide for the Commission Services, DG Budget, 
July 2004; Evaluation of Rural Development Programmes 
2000-2006 supported from the European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund – Guidelines; Guidelines 
for the Evaluation of Rural Development Programmes 
supported by SAPARD; Guidelines for the Mid-Term 
Evaluation of Rural Development Programmes funded 
by SAPARD; Handbook on Common Monitoring and 
Evaluation Framework for the programming period 2007-
2013, Guidance document, September 2006. 
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impacts (by moving from a micro-level to the 
regional- or country levels)3.
Standard evaluation questions focus 
for example on a direct effect of the RD 
programme on specific result indicators (e.g. 
farms income or employment) which requires a 
disentangling of programme effects from effects 
of other exogenously determined (programme 
independent) intervening factors. Furthermore, 
CEQ ask evaluators to quantify other programme 
effects. These include i) deadweight loss effects 
(i.e. to quantify changes observed in the situation 
of programme beneficiaries that would have 
occurred even without the programme); ii) 
leverage effects (i.e. the propensity of public 
intervention to induce private spending among 
direct beneficiaries); iii) substitution effects (i.e. 
effects obtained in favour of direct beneficiaries 
but at the expense of a person or organisation 
that does not qualify for the intervention (the 
latter are usually located in close neighbourhood 
of programme beneficiaries) (e.g. drop in profits 
of non-supported); and iv) displacement effect 
(i.e. effect obtained in an eligible area at the 
expense of another geographical area, e.g. shift 
of employment).
Although EC guidelines have been used as 
a main reference in all formal studies concerned 
with the mid-term and ex-post evaluation of EU 
RD programmes (programming period 2000-
2006), some of the suggested methodologies 
appear as insufficiently rigorous to enable a 
3 For assessment of programme results and impacts the 
evaluation guidelines recommend using various economic 
indicators (e.g. production, income, employment, etc.) 
whereby assessment of programme effects is to be carried 
out both at micro, regional and country levels. For example, 
in the case of the RD measure “Investments in agricultural 
holdings”, methodological guidelines required, inter alia, 
answering specific measure-specific questions: A.I.1. To 
what extent have the supported investments contributed 
to the incomes improvement of beneficiary farmers? A.I.2. 
To what extent have the supported investments contributed 
to a better use of production factors on holdings?, etc. 
Programme evaluators are expected to provide empirical 
evidence that “due to participation in RD programme (…), 
e.g. gross value added (agriculture/non-agriculture) or 
employment (or gross number of jobs created) in supported 
enterprises increased by x%”. 
correct answer to the CEQ. For example, the 
above guidelines, although fairly extensive 
and quantitatively oriented, allowed the 
usage of the so-called “naïve” evaluation 
techniques (e.g. before-after comparisons). As 
a consequence, in the huge majority of studies 
concerned with the quantitative assessment of 
socio-economic impacts of RD programmes 
in EU countries (programming period 2000-
2006) “naïve” approaches were employed as a 
basic evaluation methodology4. While in some 
evaluation studies the authors attempted to build 
on counterfactuals, in most cases comparisons 
between supported and non-supported units 
were carried out without any consideration for 
appropriate matching. Usually, comparison 
groups were selected arbitrarily, leading to 
quantitative results that were statistically biased 
(i.e. selection bias). Moreover, in the majority 
of qualitative evaluations, knowledge about 
a specific programme’s indirect effects, e.g. 
substitution, displacement, multiplier, etc. was 
“imputed” on the basis of anecdotal evidence 
or ad hoc surveys of a group of beneficiaries, 
opinions of administrative officials, etc. (CEAS, 
2003; PCM, 2007; EENRD, 2010). As we show 
below, these techniques are in general unsuitable 
to address appropriately a number of issues 
generally considered crucial in any quantitative 
evaluation framework, i.e. the formulation of 
an unbiased baseline (construction of relevant 
control groups for estimation of counterfactual 
outcomes) or the estimation of the programme’s 
general equilibrium effects (e.g. displacement or 
substitution effects).
Until recently, the major criticism of 
the existing EU common evaluation system 
and common indicators concerned: i) the 
relevance and appropriateness of particular 
indicators suggested by the EC; ii) the lack of a 
coherent evaluation framework linking inputs, 
4 In approximately 75% of Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE) 
studies submitted to European Commission by the end of 
2010 the impacts of EU RD programmes were assessed 
without any reference to a counterfactual situation (see: 
EC, European Commission, 2011)
10
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outputs and outcomes; iii) gaps in data in the 
programmes’ monitoring systems, and iv) the lack 
of prioritization between many indicators (e.g. 
Forstner and Plankl, 2004; CEAS 2003). While 
some of these problems have been addressed by 
the EC in the evaluation guidelines (EC, CMEF 
2006 prepared for the programming period 
2007-2013), in our view, the acceptance and 
overwhelming reliance on “naïve” evaluation 
techniques, which in extreme situations can 
bring about a considerable evaluation bias in 
the assessment of the real programme effects, 
remains especially problematic.
Clearly, far-reaching effects of inappropriate 
evaluation methodology could be the following:
•	 A lack of appropriate knowledge about the 
real impacts of the programme may result 
in the carrying out of policy interventions 
which, due to their low effectiveness/
efficiency, should have been discontinued or 
substantially re-designed.
•	 Poorly designed programmes may lead 
to an inefficient allocation of public and 
private resources, at the same time putting 
in jeopardy the achievement of policy 
objectives (e.g. poorly designed programmes 
may stimulate sectoral inefficiency, lead to a 
deterioration in competitiveness, and bring 
about progressing regional divergence). Lack 
of knowledge about the real programme 
impacts can reinforce these negative 
developments.
•	 Insufficient learning about programme 
effects can call into question not only 
the credibility of programme evaluations 
but also that of all institutions involved 
(conclusions of evaluation reports that used 
inappropriate and/or biased methods may 
be used selectively to support the interests 
of affected groups or may be contested if the 
evaluation does not conclude in favour of 
some interest groups).
Below we address the main methodological 
weaknesses of existing EU evaluation guidelines 
and suggest practical solutions enabling the 
provision of correct answers to EU Common 
Evaluation Questions. The analytical approach 
applied in this study draws on evaluation 
methodologies developed in: Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1983, 1985; Heckman, La Londe and 
Smith (1999); Heckman, et al (1998); Todd, 
P. (2008), and others. Recently developed 
advanced evaluation methodologies were 
successfully applied in a number of studies that 
focused on the measurement of effects of various 
structural, social and rural programmes in a 
number of countries, e.g. Dehejia and Wahba, 
2002 (US); Newman et. al. 2002 (Bolivia); 
Venetokis, 2004 (Finland); Jalan and Ravallion, 
2001 (Argentina); Lechner, 2002 (Switzerland); 
Larson, 2000 (Sweden); Pradhan and Rawlings, 
2002 (Nicaragua), as well as in the studies 
focused on evaluations of social funds projects 
and other programmes aimed at eliminating 
poverty (Rawlings and Schady, 2002; Walle 
and Cratty, 2002; Bourguignon and Pereira da 
Silva, 2003; Ravallion, 2004). Yet, until recently 
their application to the evaluations of EU RD 
programmes was only sporadic (Schmitt et al. 
2004; Pufahl and Weiss, 2007, Henning and 
Michalek, 2008). 
11
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...2. Methodological Approach
The main principle of the analytical 
approach chosen to evaluate EU RD programmes 
is to infer about the economic return to resources 
employed in a RD programme by comparing this 
return to its opportunity costs and answering the 
question: what would have been earned in the 
next best alternative use5.
2.1. Potential outcome model
A standard potential outcome model 
formalizes the problem of the inference about 
the impact of the participation in the given 
programme on the outcome of an individual 
unit (Roy, 1951; Rubin, 1974; Holland, 1986). 
The model adjusted to evaluations of RD 
programmes assumes that each unit/farm/region 
i potentially exposable to the RD programme/
measure also fulfils all relevant programme 
participation criteria (e.g. programme general 
and specific eligibility criteria defined in a 
country’s main programming document, i.e. 
Rural Development Plan). Observable variable 
D (a binary variable 0-1) indicates whether 
an individual unit-i participated or did not 
participate in the RD programme. Furthermore, 
the simplified model assumes existence of a 
set of variables X representing pre-exposure 
attributes (covariates) for each individual unit i, 
of which some can be observable (x), and some 
other are not observable (e) as well as a set of 
variables Y which depend on D, representing 
the potential response of unit i to the RD 
programme Yi (Di).
Obviously, Y may consist of outcome 
variables (e.g. result indicators) reflecting the 
effect of the programme at a micro-level: e.g. 
5 See Holland, 1986; Essama-Nssah, 2006,
income, profits, employment, labour productivity, 
total factor productivity, etc.
In the case of EU RD programmes Y 
represents two variables standing for potential 
responses: Yi(1) in case of participation in the RD 
programme, and Yi(0) in case of non-participation 
in the same RD programme. 
Using the potential outcome model, the 
effect of participation in an EU RD programme 
for an individual unit i (e.g. farm/region) can be 
written as:
τi = Yi (1) – Yi (0) (1)
Where:
Yi (1) = potential outcome for unit i in case of 
participation in RD programme 
Yi (0) = potential outcome for unit i in case of 
non participation in RD programme
τi = the effect of programme participation on unit 
i, relative to effect of non-participation on the 
basis of a response variable Y.
12
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While τi measures the effect of programme 
participation for i, only one of the potential 
outcomes, i.e. either Yi (1) or Yi (0) can be 
empirically observed at any given time for each 
individual unit i6. In other words, in standard 
(i.e. non-experimental) evaluation studies it is 
impossible to observe the value of the response 
variable (Y) for the same unit i under two mutually 
exclusive states of nature, i.e. participation in 
programme and non-participation (at the same 
time) (The Fundamental Problem of Causal 
Inference (FPCI), Holland, 1986).
While the FPCI makes observing causal 
effects impossible, this does not mean however 
that causal inference is impossible (see: Rubin, 
1974; 1975). In fact, determining unobservable 
outcome in (eq.1) called counterfactual outcome 
is possible and generally considered the core of 
each evaluation design7 (e.g. World Bank, 2002; 
Asian Development Bank, 2006). 
The potential outcome model allows also 
for a more explicit consideration of time. In this 
case, for each programme eligible unit i there are 
two potential outcomes (Y0it, Y1it) corresponding 
6 Generally speaking, there are two major methods to 
determine the counterfactuals, i.e. experimental design 
and quasi-experimental design. In the experimental design 
that is generally viewed as the most robust evaluation 
approach (Burtless, 1995; Bryson, et. al. 2002) one would 
have to create a control group of units which are randomly 
denied access to a programme. In this random assignment 
a control group would comprise of firms/units/individuals 
with identical distribution of observable and unobservable 
characteristics to those in the supported group. In such 
an experiment the selection problem would be overcome 
because participation is randomly determined (Bryson, et. 
al, 2002). Yet, there is a vast amount of literature showing 
that social experiments (except of in sociology, psychology, 
etc.) are often too expensive and may require the unethical 
coercion of subjects unwilling to follow the experimental 
protocol (Winship and Morgan, 1999). As experimental 
designs (randomization) in the case of evaluation of RD 
programmes would be extremely cumbersome (for ethical 
and political reasons) a non-random method (quasi-
experimental) will be used in this study. The basic idea 
behind quasi-experimental methods is that they generate 
comparison groups that are akin to the group of programme 
participants by using techniques described above.
7 Under this specification (eq.2) is equivalent to a switching 
regression model of Quandt (1972) or the Roy model of 
income distribution (Roy, 1951; Heckman and Honore, 
1990) quoted in Aakvik, et al., 2000; Heckman and 
Vytlacil, 2005). 
respectively to the non-participation (0) and 
participation (1) in an RD programme at a 
given time t. Given that, Di =1 represents unit-
i’s participation in the RD programme, and Di = 
0 non-participation, the time-specific potential 
outcome on unit i can be described as:
Yit = Di Y1it + (1-Di) Y0it  (2) 
The potential outcome equation in case of 
programme participation can also be expressed as: 
Y1it = μ1 (Xit) + U1it  (3)
and the potential outcome in case of non-
participation in RD programme as in (4):
Y0it = μ0 (Xit) + U0it (4)
Where:
Xit is a vector of observed random 
variables not affected by treatment (programme 
participation), and
(U1it, U0it) are unobserved random variables 
which are distributed independently across units 
i’s and satisfy conditions: E(U1it)=0 and E(U0it) = 0
Given 3 and 4 and assuming that treatment 
(i.e. programme support) takes place in period k 
(t > k) the individual specific treatment effect, for 
any vector of covariates Xi can be described as 
(Blundell and Costa Dias, 2002):
αit (Xit) = [μ1 (Xit) - μ0 (Xit)] + [U1it - U0it]      (5)
where: t > k and μ0 and μ1 are defined as in 
eq 3 and 4. 
Typically we cannot expect that all i-units 
will be affected by the given RD programme in 
exactly the same way. Depending on an assumed 
individual programme response of each i-unit the 
explicit modelling and aggregation of programme 
effects can be carried out at various complexity 
levels.
13
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...2.2. Homogenous Treatment Effects
Following Blundell and Costa Dias (2002) and 
Caliendo and Hujer (2005) a homogeneous treatment 
effect is the simplest case where the programme 
effect is assumed to be constant across individuals/
units. Under the assumption that treatment takes 
place in a period k, the homogeneous (for all units i) 
treatment effect is defined as (6):
αt = αit (Xit) = [μ1 (Xit) - μ0 (Xit)] where: t > k   (6)
where αt is constant for any unit/individual i. 
For the case of a homogeneous treatment effect 
μ1 and μ0 are two parallel curves only differing in 
level. Assuming homogenous treatment effects, the 
modelling of the aggregated programme impact can 
be carried out by means of an outcome equation (7) 
in which the participation specific error terms are 
not affected by the treatment status.
The corresponding outcome equation can be 
expressed as (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2002): 
Yit = μ0 (Xit) + αt Dit + Ui (7) 
2.3. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
In case of heterogeneous treatment effects 
it is assumed that treatment impact varies across 
individuals/units (a possible effect of an observable 
component or as a part of the unobservables).
In this case the outcome equation differs 
from eq 7 and can be rewritten (Blundell and 
Costa Dias, 2002; Caliendo and Hujer, 2005) as:
Yit = Di Y1it + (1-Di) Y0it = μ0 (Xit) + αt (Xit) Dit 
+ [Ui0 + Dit (U1it - U0it)]   (8)
It is important to notice that the form 
of the error term differs across observations 
according to their treatment status. Contrary to 
the homogenous treatment effect this structure 
does not allow extrapolation to all population 
strata of units-i (e.g. to areas of the support of 
X that are not represented at least among the 
treated). Furthermore, if there is selection on 
unobservables, the OLS estimator after controlling 
for covariates X is inconsistent for αt (X) (Blundell 
and Costa Dias, 2002). 
As performance of farms supported by a 
RD programme cannot be directly observed 
in a “non-support” situation (a farm cannot 
simultaneously participate and not participate in 
the same programme) the economic performance 
of farms supported by the RD programme in a 
“non-support” situation (base-line) has to be 
simulated, using more advanced techniques. 
Construction of an appropriate base-
line should provide us with an answer to the 
question: “what would have been a given 
outcome for a farm supported by the RD 
programme if the programme had not been 
implemented?” By comparing performance 
outcomes of supported farms with a control 
group of farms in two data points; i.e. prior 
to support and after its conclusion, we can 
straightforwardly answer two questions: 1). 
What was the effect of exogenously determined 
factors8 on the performance of farms supported 
by the programme?, and 2). What was the effect 
of the programme support?
8 All factors which influence performance of supported 
and non-supported regions and are not considered as RD 
programme related can be called exogenous. 
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RD programmes
In the standard EU evaluation practice, where 
experimental studies of a random assignment 
to the group of programme participants and 
non-participants are not possible, evaluators of 
RD programmes usually apply four alternative 
naïve techniques to estimate the impact of the 
programme: 
3.1. Naive “before-after” estimator for 
programme participants
Naive before-after estimator uses pre-
programme data on programme beneficiaries to 
compute (counterfactual!) programme outcomes 
for programme participants defined in eq (1). 
Naive before-after estimator is defined in eq 9.
τi (naive “before-after”) = EN [Yit=1|Di=1] – EN 
[Yit=0|Di=1]   (9)
where :
N is a sample size in observed survey of 
programme participants (i) 
EN [Yit=1|Di=1] is the sample mean of the 
outcome for those observed as programme 
participants (i) after participation in programme 
(T=1)
EN [Yit=0|Di=1] is the sample mean of the 
outcome for those observed as programme 
participants (i) before their participation in the 
programme (T=0)
The problem with this approach is that 
information about EN [Yit=1|Di=1] and EN 
[Yit=0|Di=1] (usually obtained from quasi-
scientific interviews carried out on sampled 
programme participants9) and related difference 
in the outcome indicators (e.g. profits, 
employment, etc) in time T0 => T1 is arbitrarily 
attributed to the effect of the RD programme.
The implicit and rather unjustifiable 
assumptions of this evaluation technique are:
•	 In the absence of policy intervention (RD 
programme) the outcome indicator of 
programme participants would have been 
the same as before the programme.
•	 Changes in outcomes of programme 
participants are not affected by any other 
factor (e.g. macroeconomic, regional etc.) 
but are the effect of the RD programme only.
Although it is obvious that over years 
specific outcome indicators, e.g. gross income 
or profits do not remain unchanged, some 
evaluators assign the whole effect of observable 
change in an outcome indicator to the 
programme. By doing so the real impact of a 
given programme may be massively overstated 
(Graphs 1a -c). 
9 In a huge majority of cases due to lack of data in monitoring 
systems phone interviews or the CATI (computed-assisted 
telephone interview) method (self-assessment) were used 
(PCM, 2007; CEAS, 2003). 
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...Graph 1a. Naive before-after estimation
Graph 1b. Significance of the relevant base-line (“no programme” scenario) for the same (!) farm/
enterprise (small positive real programme effect)
Graph 1c. Significance of the relevant base-line (“no programme” scenario) for the same (!) farm/
enterprise – negative real programme effect
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participants” estimator
Another technique commonly characterized 
as a naïve evaluation approach uses all non-
participants as a control group.
τi (naïve “participants vs. non-participants”) 
= EN [Yit=1|Di=1] – EM [Yjt=1|Di=0]  (10a)
where :
•	 N is a sample size in observed survey of 
programme participants (i);
•	 M is a sample size in observed survey of 
programme non-participants (j);
•	 EN [Yit=1|Di=1] is the sample mean of the 
outcome for those observed as programme 
participants (i) after participation in 
programme (T=1);
•	 EM [Yjt=1|Di=0] is the sample mean of the 
outcome for observed programme non-
participants (j) in time T=1;
While monitoring systems of RD programmes 
usually do not contain any information on 
appropriate control groups of non-participants, the 
data about EM [Yjt=1|Di=0] is obtained on the basis 
of (rather ad-hoc) surveys carried out by programme 
evaluators on selected outcome indicators (e.g. 
profits, employment, etc.) for those who did not 
participate in RD programme (irrespectively on 
the level of similarity between these two groups) 
without any considerations regarding comparability 
between both groups (and eventual accounting 
for systematic differences). The approach relies 
on the assumption that in the absence of the 
programme the outcome indicator of programme 
participants would be the same as for programme 
non-participants. Yet, this would only be justifiable 
if the systematic performance of programme 
participants (measured by any arbitrary outcome 
indicator, e.g. income, profit or employment) 
was identical with the outcome performance of 
programme non-participants. Had this not been the 
case, the selection bias B(X) that results from using 
the outcomes of non-participants as proxy for the 
outcomes that programme participants would have 
experienced had they not participated can be very 
substantial and is equal to (Heckman, Ichimura, 
Smith and Todd, 1996):
B(X) = E (Y0|X, D=1) – E (Y0| X, D=0).  (10b)
Obviously programme effects shown in 
Graph 2 are overstated due to incorrectly 
calculated “base-line” (systematic performance 
of non-participants included in a control 
group differs from systematic performance of 
participants, even in the absence of a given 
programme). 
Graph 2. Observable heterogeneity, e.g. participants are "better performing"than non-participants/or 
national average
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(i.e. participants and non-participants) 
sample average” estimator
Another naive estimator commonly applied 
in empirical evaluation studies of RD programmes 
uses a control group constructed as a population 
average (i.e. consisting of programme participants 
and non-participants).
τi (naive “participants vs. overall sample 
average”) = EN [Yit=1|Di=1] – ENM [Yijt=1|Di=0]    (11)
where :
•	 N is a sample size in observed survey of 
programme participants (i);
•	 NM is a joint sample size in observed survey 
of programme participants (i) and non-
participants (j);
•	 EN [Yit=1|Di=1] is the sample mean of the 
outcome for those observed as programme 
participants (i) after participation in 
programme (T=1);
•	 ENM [Yijt=1|Di=0] is the sample mean of 
the outcome for observed joint sample 
of programme participants (i) and non-
participants (j) in time (T=1);
In this evaluation “technique” necessary data 
on average outcome indicators in the group of 
“non-participants” is usually obtained from various 
national surveys. The approach relies on the similar 
assumption as in case of (3.2) that in the absence of 
the programme the outcome indicator of programme 
participants would be the same as the average of a 
joint group of programme participants and non-
participants. This however would only be justifiable 
if systematic performance of the group of programme 
participants (measured by any arbitrary outcome 
indicator, e.g. income, profit or employment) was 
identical with the performance of the joint-group of 
programme participants and non-participants.
As shown in Lechner (2001), an effect based 
on comparisons of a treatment group to an 
aggregated comparison group of individuals has 
no meaningful casual interpretation and can lead 
to fairly misleading results. 
3.4. Conventional “difference in 
differences” (DID) estimator 
(without appropriate matching 
between programme participants 
and the control group)
A conventional DID estimator can be 
expressed as in (12)
DID = (EN [Yit=1|Di=1] – EN [Yit=0|Di=1]) – 
(EM [Yit=1|Di=0] – EM [Yjt=0|Di=0])  (12)
This estimator compares the before-after 
changes of programme participants (i) with the 
before-and-after changes of outcome indicators 
for arbitrary selected non-participants (j), 
whereby the estimation of the effect of the RD 
programme is usually obtained on the basis of 
panel data models involving group of programme 
participants and an arbitrary group of programme 
non-participants. The DID estimator is already 
more advanced compared with techniques 
described above as it additionally assumes that 
selection to a programme depends on both 
observables as well as unobservables. Although 
in this method any common trend in the 
outcomes of programme participants and non-
participants (fixed selection bias) gets differenced 
out, the crucial assumption justifying this method 
is that selection bias remains time invariant (so 
called fixed-effect). 
Although conventional DID, due to the 
lack of appropriate data has so far not been 
very popular in the evaluation of EU RD 
programmes, it can be easily shown that this 
estimator is problematic if in the absence of 
policy intervention the differences between 
performance of programme participants (i) and 
non-participants (j) do not remain constant 
over time. In this situation DID estimator will 
produce biased estimates of programme effects. 
Generally speaking, the available evidence 
suggests that conventional DID estimators, 
though supported by plausible stories about 
“fixed” differences in motivation, ability or 
performance, may be a poor choice in many 
evaluation contexts (Smith, 2000). 
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evaluators
Given the above techniques and their 
methodological weaknesses it becomes obvious 
that basic problems faced by evaluators of RD 
programmes concern:
•	 Elimination of a selection bias: A selection 
bias in evaluating the impact of an RD 
programme occurs if the mean outcome of 
those units which participated in the RD 
programme differs from the mean outcome of 
non-supported units even in the absence of 
support. An important problem which usually 
arises while simply comparing average 
data for programme participants and non-
participants is that many RD programmes/
measures are not assigned randomly but: i) 
are designed to target specific beneficiaries 
with a certain performance characteristic 
(e.g. under performed producers/enterprises/
areas, etc.), or ii) include various eligibility 
conditions (e.g. reimbursement of project 
costs after finalization of the project) 
which, in practice, can only be fulfilled by 
certain types of economic units, e.g. the 
best enterprises. In both cases, a supported 
group may easily outperform/under-perform 
specific control groups or national averages, 
making simple comparisons of both groups’ 
performance statistically biased and 
unacceptable. Another type of distortion 
can be the so called “self-selection” bias10. 
To assess the programme’s impact, one has 
to infer the counterfactual on what would 
10 Self-selection bias may appear if enterprises that anticipated 
participation in the RD programme already adjusted its 
own performance prior to the start of the programme, e.g. 
in order to comply with programme eligibility criteria. In 
such situation, even if the group of programme participants 
was very similar to a control group, making comparisons 
of both groups just “before” and “after” participation in 
the programme could lead a significant control bias. The 
important consequence for evaluation is that this type of 
bias should be eliminated first before the programme 
impact assessment is undertaken
have been in the absence of the programme 
(this calls for data on programme non-
participants). But, even with good data on 
observable characteristics both for supported 
and non-supported units, a reliable 
comparison between those two groups 
is not easy. Ideally, control enterprises/
producers should differ from the supported 
group only in so far as they do not receive 
any intervention. To be meaningful, a control 
group should therefore include only those 
enterprises which match in their observable 
characteristics with supported enterprises 
(prior to the programme). Moreover, the 
“similarity” of both groups should be 
statistically tested and all “undesired” 
differences explicitly accounted for by 
applying modern evaluation methodologies. 
•	 Disentangling an effect of the programme 
from other effects: An assessment of a 
programme’s impact requires a response to 
the question: What would have happened 
to supported enterprises without an RD 
programme? Clearly, a counterfactual 
performance of supported enterprises cannot 
be directly observed. For the same reason, 
in non-experimental studies a programme’s 
impact (causal effects) should be assessed 
by making comparisons between supported 
enterprises with possibly identical ones 
which did not benefit from the programme.
A review of available mid-term and ex-
post evaluation reports of EU RD programmes 
shows that answers to EC Common Evaluation 
Questions (CEQ) have mostly been provided by 
applying qualitative methods, i.e. interviews and 
surveys (sometimes complemented with ad hoc 
quantitative indicators). 
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In the majority of cases, “quantitative” effects 
of the programme have been assessed on the 
basis of interviews with programme beneficiaries, 
without formulation of a necessary base-line, 
i.e. without construction of an appropriate 
counterfactual situation11. In a few cases where 
comparisons between programme beneficiaries 
and non-beneficiaries were carried out this was 
done without any consideration for appropriate 
matching. Furthermore, quantitative knowledge 
about specific programme effects (i.e. substitution, 
displacement, etc.) was in most cases “imputed” 
on the basis of anecdotal evidence or ad hoc 
surveys of a group of beneficiaries, opinions of 
administrative officials, etc.12 
The rigorous assessment of the impact of 
a policy intervention in the framework of rural 
development programmes proved to be difficult,
11 For example, assessment of the effect of an investment 
support under RD programmes (e.g. investments in 
agricultural holdings, renewal of villages, etc.) was in 
most of cases carried out by: i) Interviewing selected 
program beneficiaries on the impact of support, whereby 
the positive “impact” of supported investment on value 
added, competitiveness, etc. was “measured” and 
“evaluated” by referring to the number (%) of affirmative 
vs. negative responses obtained from interviewed 
beneficiaries (CEAS, 2003; Forstner and Plankl, 2004), ii) 
Deriving some quasi-quantitative information on the basis 
of interviews conducted among supported units (Tissen 
and Schrader, 1998); iii) Comparing various outcome 
indicators characterising supported enterprises (!) at the 
beginning of support and after it (e.g. before and after 
investment situation) (e.g. RDP 2004-2006 Slovakia; 
Mid-term evaluation of SAPARD in Slovakia, 2003); iv) 
Comparing some average outcome indicators between 
units which were supported by the program with those 
which were not. Yet, failure to control for differences in the 
pre-intervention characteristics of program participants 
and non-participants severely biased such comparisons. 
12 See CEAS, 2003; Forstner and Plankl, 2004
in particular, because mainly crude evaluation 
techniques were used. Evidence shows that due 
to the application of inappropriate methodology 
and the lack of data, in the huge majority of 
cases important CEQs concerned with the 
evaluation of EU RD programmes were only 
partly answered or were not answered at all by 
evaluators (FAL, 2006).
Inappropriate methodology and problems 
with data resulted in the meagre quality of many 
evaluation reports. As Toulemonde, et al. stated: 
the “strength (of evaluation reports) has to be 
nuanced because often conclusions on impacts 
were purely descriptive and failed to provide a 
cause-and-effects analysis. This is why criterion 
– sound analysis was one of the most poorly 
rated”13. This development was also confirmed in 
other studies14. 
13 See: Toulemonde et al. , 2002
14 For example, Forstner and Plankl, 2004 wrote: 
“Evaluations, as they were performed thus far, mainly use 
pragmatic approaches to keep up with given timetables…
The trend is that profound scientific analysis is loosing 
ground in evaluation studies which are obligatory. Due to 
the public budget constraints this trend is continuing or 
even gaining momentum”.
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programmes
5.1. Relevant policy indicators
Depending on concrete policy interest the 
EU common evaluation questions (CEQ) can 
be systematically answered by focusing on the 
impact of a given RD programme on various types 
of individuals/farms (groups) directly or indirectly 
affected by the RD programme. Answers to the 
CEQ (addressing a particular group of “gainers”) 
may be provided using relevant policy indicators 
measuring the impact of the programme:
5.1.1. Average Treatment Effect (ATE)
The first indicator which can be applied to 
evaluate RD programmes is the (population) average 
treatment effect (ATE). This indicator is simply 
the difference between the expected outcomes 
after participation in the RD programme and non-
participation conditional on X (Heckman, 1996; 
Imbens, 2003; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2007).
ΔATE (x) = E (Δ|X = x), where: Δ = Y1 – Y0       (13)
ATE is the effect of assigning participation 
randomly to every unit i of type X (ignoring 
programme general equilibrium effects) and 
describes an expected gain from participating 
in the RD programme for a randomly selected 
farm/individual from the joined sub-groups of 
programme participants and non-participants 
in a given programme area. This policy indicator 
averages the effect of the programme over all units 
in the population, including both programme 
participants and non-participants.
Depending on the data set used for the 
calculation of this indicator, the sample average 
treatment effect (SATE) can be estimated by 
taking an average value of all (Y1it - Y0it) in a 
given sample k used for an analysis (Imbens and 
Wooldridge, 2007), i.e.
SATE = 1/k Σ (Y1it - Y0it) for i = 1…k      (13a) 
On the other hand, if the focus of policies 
is the estimation of average treatment effects 
for the population at large one can estimate 
the population average treatment effect (PATE) 
defined as:
PATE = E (Y1 – Y0)   (13b)
Whereby, the estimation of PATE requires 
some knowledge about distribution probability of 
individual units.
Although SATE is the best estimator for PATE 
one cannot estimate PATE without error because 
the potential outcomes for those population 
members not included in the sample are missing. 
According to Imbens and Wooldridge (2007) the 
implications of using SATE/PATE are as follows: 
i) one can estimate SATE at least as accurately as 
the PATE and typically more accurately, and ii) a 
good estimator for PATE is automatically a good 
estimator for SATE, and iii) as a given sample may 
not be representative for the population at large 
some caution is required if results of SATE are to 
be generalized. 
Like every specific policy indicator, ATE also 
has some disadvantages. The first concerns the 
addressing of important policy aspects, i.e. clear 
targeting of intervention. Irrespective of whether 
the policy analysts use SATE or PATE to evaluate 
programme results, specific problems arise due 
to the fact that ATE includes the effect on units/
farms/individuals for which the programme was 
never intended/designed (it may include the 
impact on units that may even be programme 
ineligible). 
In non-experimental studies, provision of 
an empirical answer to the standard evaluation 
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question always involves comparisons of 
programme participants with non-participants. 
Yet, a typical question which arises is: which 
units should be compared, i.e. which units best 
represent programme participants had they not 
participated?
While some evaluators try to estimate 
ATE using differences in means of E(Y1|D=1) 
and E(Y0|D=0) it can be shown that the bias 
resulting from this approach is equal to (eq 13c) 
(Heckmann and Lozano, 2003):
B(ATE) = E(Y1| X, D=1) – E (Y0|X, D=0) – [E 
(Y1-Y0)|X]  (13c)
5.1.2. Average Treatment of Treated (ATT)
Given the deficiencies of ATE another 
evaluation indicator can be used, describing the 
average impact of programme participation on 
units/farms/individuals that participated in the 
programme, the so called: the average treatment 
on the treated (ATT) (see eq. 14):
ΔATT (x) = E(Δ|X=x, D=1)  (14) 
which is equivalent to: 
E(Y1-Y0|D=1) = E (Y1| D =1)–E (Y0|D =1)     (14a) 
Where: E (Y0|D =1) is not directly observable 
(it describes the hypothetical outcome without a 
programme’s support of those who participated in 
the programme)
In contrast to ATE, interpretation of ATT is 
much more policy relevant. While ATT focuses 
on the effect of the programme on programme 
participants, it also describes the gross gain 
accruing to the economy from the existence of 
the programme compared with an alternative 
of shutting it down (Heckman and Robb, 1985; 
Heckman, 1997; Smith, 2000; Smith and 
Todd, 2003). Combined with information on 
programme costs and general equilibrium effects 
the ATT indicator can therefore answer the policy 
question regarding the net gain to the economy15. 
Although ATT is generally applicable to 
provide answers to RD Common Evaluation 
Questions concerning the effect of the RD 
programme on units that participated in the 
programme, the empirical estimation of ATT 
is not straightforward. To illustrate the problem 
we consider both components of ATT (i.e. E 
(Y1| D =1) and E (Y0|D =1). It is obvious that E 
(Y1| D =1) can be easily identified from data on 
programme participants. In practical evaluations, 
the term E (Y1| D =1) describes specific outcomes 
(e.g. in form of result indicators), e.g. profits, 
employment, labour productivity or total 
productivity, etc. observable among programme 
beneficiaries after implementation of the given 
RD programme. On the other hand, the expected 
value of (Y0|D =1), i.e. the counterfactual mean 
in outcome (potential outcome in case of non-
participation) of those who participated in the 
programme cannot be directly observed.
Given the above, one has to choose a proper 
substitute for unobservable E(Y0| D = 1) in order 
to estimate ATT.
So far, and only if the condition (14b) holds, 
one could use the non-participants directly as an 
adequate control group. 
E (Y0| D =1) = E (Y0|D =0)   (14b) 
Yet, this condition is likely to hold only in 
randomized experiments (Caliendo and Hujer, 
2005). In most of non-experimental studies 
estimation of ATT using the differences in 
outcome means of programme participants and 
non-participants results in a selection bias (B) 
defined as in eq (14c). 
15 Depending on research interest it may be distinguished 
between the average treatment effect on treated sample 
(SATT) and the average treatment effect on treated for 
a population at large (PATT) in a manner similar to the 
one explained above for SATE and PATE (Imbens and 
Wooldridge, 2007).
22
5.
 A
dv
an
ce
d 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 t
o 
th
e 
ev
al
ua
ti
on
 o
f 
R
D
 p
ro
gr
am
m
es B (X) = E (Y0| D =1) - E (Y0|D =0)  (14c)
The selection bias arises because the means 
of Y0 for programme participants (D=1) and Y0 for 
non-participants (D=0) may differ systematically, 
even in the absence of the programme. 
ATT can also be defined conditional on P(Z): 
ΔATT (x) = E(Δ|X=x, P(Z)=p, D=1)  (14d)
Where: P is a probability distribution of 
observed covariances Z
As (14) and (14d) are equivalent, the latter 
formulation will be used in our study for the 
calculation of effects of an RD programme. Various 
methods which aim at the elimination of selection 
bias and estimation of it are described in Section 4.
5.1.3. Marginal Treatment Effect (MTE)
In some cases, policy makers are interested 
in indicators that show the impact of expansion 
of the programme to a marginal unit that is 
indifferent between participation and non-
participation. The Marginal Treatment Effect 
(MTE) indicator (see: Björklund and Moffitt, 
1987; Heckman, 1997; Heckman and Vytlacil 
1999, 2000) is defined as follows:
ΔMTE (x, u) = E (Δ|X = x, UD = u)  (15)
ΔMTE (x, u) is the average effect of 
participation in the RD programme for those 
units i which are on the margin of indifference 
between participation in the programme (D=1) or 
non-participation (D = 0), where u = ZβD. One 
can therefore interpret ΔMTE (x, u) as the mean 
gain in terms of Y1 – Y0 for units i with observed 
characteristics X which would be indifferent 
between participation in the RD programme 
and non-participation if they were exogenously 
assigned a value of Z, say z, such that μD(z)= uD 
(Heckman, 2005).
For values of u close to zero, ΔMTE (x, u) 
is the average treatment effect for units i with 
unobservable characteristics that make them 
most likely to participate, and for values u close 
to one it is the average treatment effect for units i 
with unobservable characteristics that make them 
the least likely to participate.
Evaluation of the MTE parameter at low 
values of u averages the outcome gain for those 
with unobservables that make them least likely 
to participate. Evaluation of it at high values of 
u is the average gain for those individuals with 
unobservables that make them most likely to 
participate (Heckman, et. al, 2003).
While the estimate of ΔATT provides an 
evaluator with some interesting information 
about a general impact of the RD programme, i.e. 
facilitates decision about abolition or retention 
of the RD measure, the ΔMTE is informative on 
the question of whether the units participating 
in the RD programme benefit from it in gross 
terms (net effects should also consider the costs 
of programme participation). The parameter 
ΔMTE estimates the gross gain from the marginal 
expansion of the programme.
The bias in MTE is the difference between 
average U1 for programme participants and 
marginal U1 minus the difference between 
average U0 for non-participants and marginal 
U0. Each of these terms is a bias which may be 
called selection bias (Heckmann and Navarro-
Lozano, 2004).
5.1.4. Average Treatment on Non-Treated
Of considerable interest to evaluators of EU 
RD programmes can also be a measurement of 
the effect of a given RD programme on those who 
did not participate in it. The ATNT evaluation 
indicator is defined as 
ATNT = E(Y1| D = 0) – E(Y0| D = 0).        (16)
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As E (Y1|D=0) cannot be observed directly it 
must be calculated as counterfactual.
5.2. Construction of an appropriate 
baseline
Obviously, in the context of non-experimental 
studies the counterfactuals cannot be estimated 
directly, in a manner analogous to the one based on 
randomization. Given a possibility of a significant 
bias in results obtained from using crude evaluation 
techniques various other methods may be applied 
aiming at elimination/correction of this bias. The 
most prominent are: matching methods, the method 
of control functions and the method of instrumental 
variables (Heckman and Navarro-Lozano, 2004).
5.2.1. Matching methods
Matching methods seek to mimic conditions 
similar to experiments, in a way that the 
assessment of the impact of the RD programme 
can be based on comparison of outcomes for a 
group of programme participants (D=1) with those 
drawn from a comparison group of programme 
non-participants (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; 
Smith and Todd, 2003; Heckman and Navarro-
Lozano, 2004). In principle, matching can be 
viewed as a method of strategic sub-sampling 
from among programme participants and control 
cases whereby the selection of control cases 
for each programme participant is based on the 
observable characteristics of covariates Xi.
Matching methods are based on the 
identifying assumption that conditional on some 
covariates X, the outcome Y is independent of D.
Application of matching to a consistent 
evaluation of programme effects makes the 
following two assumptions crucial (Rosenbaum 
and Rubin, 1983a)16:
16 Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983a) refer to the combination 
of the two assumptions (unconfoundedness and overlap) 
as “strongly ignorable treatment assignment”
Unconfoundedness assumption: (Y0, Y1) ┴ D |X 
Where: ┴ denotes independence
To yield consistent estimates of the 
programme impact, matching methods assume 
that conditional on observed covariates 
X, potential outcomes are independent of 
programme participation, or in other words, 
that (conditional on observed covariates X) 
the assignment (programme participation) 
probabilities do not depend on the potential 
outcomes. The unconfoundedness assumption 
is often controversial, as it assumes that 
beyond the observed covariates X there are no 
(unobserved) characteristics of the individual 
associated both with the potential outcomes 
and programme participation (Imbens and 
Wooldridge, 2007).
Overlap assumption: 0 < Pr (D =1|X ) <1
The overlap assumption prevents X from 
being a perfect predictor in the sense that 
one can find for each programme participant 
a counterpart in the non-participant group 
and vice versa (Caliendo and Hujer, 2005). 
If there are regions where the support of X 
does not overlap for the participants and non-
participants, matching has to be performed 
over the common support only (see below). A 
weaker version of overlap assumption implies 
the possible existence of a non-participant 
similar to each participant.
To avoid a lack of comparable units one 
can restrict matching and hence the estimation 
of the effect of programme participation to the 
region of common support, equivalent to the 
overlap condition. The latter not only rules 
out the phenomenon of perfect predictability 
of D given X but also ensures that units with 
the same X values have positive probability of 
being both participants and non-participants 
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LaLonde and Smith, 1999). 17
Matching assumes that there exists a set of 
observable conditioning variables Z (which may 
be a subset of X) for which the non-participation 
outcome Y0 is independent of participation status 
D conditional on Z, or Y0 ┴ D|Z. It is also assumes 
that for all Z there is a positive probability of 
either participating (D=1) or not participating 
(D=0) in a programme, which also implies that a 
match can be found for all D=1 units (Smith and 
Todd, 2003)18. Conditional on the observables Z, 
outcomes for the non-participants represent what 
the participants would have experienced had they 
not participated in the RD programme (under 
assumption that selection into the RD programme 
is based entirely on observable characteristics). 
For further explanation of consequences by 
choosing only a sub-set of conditional variables 
see: Chapter: 5.3 (below).
5.2.2. Application of the Propensity Score
Various empirical studies show that 
traditional matching may be difficult if the set 
of conditioning variables Z is large, due to the 
“curse of dimensionality” (problem of empty 
cells19) of the conditioning problem (Zhao, 2005; 
Todd, 2006; Black and Smith, 2004). As the 
number of observable characteristics in the group 
of programme participants increases linearly, 
the number of necessary observations in the 
17 Following Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1998), the 
importance of the overlap assumption can be illustrated 
on example of a situation where for some values of 
x we have either p(x) =0 or p(x)=1, i.e. in which one 
would find some units i with covariates implying that 
those units either always participate or never participate 
in the programme. If they always participated there 
would not have counterparts in the comparison group 
(non-participants). On the other hand, had they never 
participated, they would never have had counterparts in 
the group of programme participants.
18 It can be shown that assumption Y0 ┴ D|Z is overly 
strong if parameter of interest is the mean impact of 
treatment on treated (TT) in which case conditional mean 
independence suffices: E(Y0|Z, D=1) = E (Y0|Z, D=0) = 
E(Y0|Z), see: Smith and Todd, 2003. 
19 For example with just 20 binary covariates there are 220 
covariate patterns (1.04 mill possibilities).
control group increases exponentially. Moreover, 
matching on all the covariates using a distance 
measure, which effectively regards all interactions 
among the X covariates as equally important, 
does not work very well (Gu and Rosenbaum, 
1993; Rubin and Thomas, 1996).
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed that 
the dimensionality of the conditioning problem 
can be dramatically reduced by implementing 
matching methods through the use of so-
called balancing scores b(Z), i.e. functions of 
the relevant observed covariates Z such that 
conditional distribution of Z given b(Z) is 
independent of the assignment into treatment. 
One possible balancing score is the propensity 
score, i.e. the probability of participating in a 
programme given observed characteristics Z.
For random variables Y and Z and for 
discrete variable D, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
defined the propensity score as the conditional 
probability of participating in a programme given 
pre-programme characteristics Z:
p(Z) ≡ Pr (D=1|Z) = E(D|Z) (17)
where Z is a multidimensional vector of pre-
programme characteristics.
They showed that if the participation in a 
programme is random conditional on Z, it is also 
random conditional on p(Z):
E(D|Y, Pr(D=1|Z)) = E(E(D|Y, Z)|Y, 
Pr(D=1|Z))    (18)
so that
E(D|Y,Z)=E(D|Z) implies E(D|Y, 
Pr(D=1)|Z))=E(D|Pr(D=1|Z))  (19)
Where: Pr (D=1|Z) is a propensity score
The above equations imply that when 
outcomes are independent of programme 
participation conditional on Z, they are also 
25
C
ou
nt
er
fa
ct
ua
l i
m
pa
ct
 e
va
lu
at
io
n 
of
 E
U
 r
ur
al
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t p
ro
gr
am
m
es
 -
 P
ro
pe
ns
ity
 S
co
re
 M
at
ch
in
g 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
...
independent of participation conditional on 
the propensity score, Pr (D=1|Z). Thus, when 
matching on Z is valid, matching on the summary 
statistic Pr(D = 1 | Z) (the propensity score) is also 
valid (Todd, 2008). Conditional independence 
remains therefore valid if we use the propensity 
score p(Z) instead of covariates Z or X. 
One of the important results of Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1983) is the conclusion that there is 
nothing to be gained by matching (or stratifying) 
in a more refined way on the variables in Z than 
on the propensity score alone that is a function 
of the variables Z. The propensity score therefore 
contains all the information that is needed to 
create a balanced evaluation design (Winship 
and Morgan, 1999).
The major advantage of this result is that 
in empirical studies a conditional participation 
probability can be estimated using a parametric 
method, such as probit or logit, or semi-
parametrically using a method that converges 
faster than the non-parametric rate. In such a 
situation the dimensionality of the matching 
problem can be reduced substantially by using 
a one dimension only, i.e. on the univariate 
propensity score.
An important feature of this method is that 
after the units are matched, the unmatched 
comparison units can easily be separated out 
and are not directly used in the estimation of 
programme effects.
The Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
estimator for ATT can be written in general as:
τPSM = E (P(Z)|D=1 (E(Y1|D=1, P(Z)) – 
E(Y0|D=0, P(Z))  (20) 
which is simply the mean difference 
in outcomes over the common support, 
appropriately weighted by the propensity score 
distribution of programme participants (see: 
Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005).
5.2.3. Propensity score matching algorithms
As the probability of observing two units with 
exactly the same value of the propensity score 
is in principle zero (since p(Z) is a continuous 
variable) the estimation of desirable programme 
effects requires the use of appropriate matching 
algorithms which define the measure of proximity 
in order to define programme non-participants who 
are acceptably close (e.g. in terms of the propensity 
score) to any given programme participant.
The most commonly used matching 
algorithms are: Nearest Neighbour Matching, 
Radius Matching, Stratification Matching and 
Kernel Matching (Cochran and Rubin, 1973; 
Dehejia and Wahba, 1999; Heckman, Ichimura 
and Todd. 1997, 1998; Heckman; Ichimura, 
Smith and Todd, 1998; Todd, 2006, 2008).
5.2.3.1. Nearest neighbour matching
In this matching method the non-participant 
with the value of Pj that is closest to participant’s 
Pi is selected as the match:
C (Pi ) = minj     Pi - Pj  (21)
Where: P is a propensity score
The most prominent variants of nearest 
matching are i) matching with replacement, i.e. 
farm/individual/unit which did not participate in 
the programme can be used more than once as 
a match; and ii) matching without replacement 
where respective programme non-participants 
can match only once. The biggest disadvantage of 
the nearest neighbour method is that it can result 
in bad matches if the closest neighbour (control 
unit) is situated far away (in terms of propensity 
score) from a supported unit. 
5.2.3.2. Caliper matching
This method is to be considered as a variation 
of the nearest neighbour method. A match for a 
firm i is selected only if:
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Where ε is pre-specified tolerance
By using caliper matching bad matches 
can be avoided by imposing a tolerance level 
on the maximum propensity score distance. The 
disadvantage of this method is the difficulty to 
know a priori what tolerance level is reasonable 
(Smith and Todd, 2005).
5.2.3.3. Kernel matching
Kernel matching is defined as:
 (23)
Where:
W are weights for i and j
G is a kernel function 
an stands for the bandwidth.
Various kernel functions can be used in 
applied work; the Gaussian, the Epanechnikow, 
biweight, triweight or the cosine functions. 
This non-parametric matching estimator 
(kernel) is especially interesting as it allows 
for a match of each programme participant 
with multiple units in a control group with 
weights which depend on the distance 
between the participant observation for which 
a counterfactual is being constructed and 
each comparison group observation. In this 
method weights are inversely proportional to 
the distance between the propensity scores of 
participants and controls within the common 
support level (the further away a comparison 
unit is from the participant unit, the lower the 
weight it receives in the computation of the 
counterfactual outcome). The main advantage 
of this method is that a lower variance 
is achieved because more information is 
used20. Another useful property of applying 
this method is a possibility of using standard 
bootstrap techniques for the estimation of 
standard errors for matching estimators that in 
generally should not be applied when using 
nearest neighbour matching (Abadie and 
Imbens, 2004; Todd, 2006).
5.2.3.4. Local linear weighting function
Local linear weighting function (Heckman, 
Ichimura and Todd, 1997; Smith and Todd, 2003)) 
can be defined as:
(24)
Where:
W = weights 
The difference between kernel matching and 
local linear matching is that the latter includes 
in addition to the intercept a linear term in the 
propensity score of a treated individual. This 
is an advantage whenever comparison group 
observations are distributed asymmetrically 
around the treated observation, e.g. at boundary 
points, or when there are gaps in the propensity 
score distribution (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005).
5.2.4. Selection of appropriate matching 
algorithm
Obviously, the specification of a matching 
algorithm hinges on the two basics factors, 
i.e. definition of proximity (in the propensity 
score space) and determination of weights 
(weighting function) (Essama-Nssah, 2006). In 
some empirical studies 1-to-1 or 1-to-n nearest 
neighbour with calliper are used as a standard 
application. In others, the kernel matching is 
20 A systematic analysis of the finite-sample properties 
of various propensity score matching and weighting 
estimators through Monte Carlo simulation can be found 
in: Frölich, 2004.
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favoured. Empirical comparison of matching 
methods suggests that their performance can 
vary case-by-case thus no one method fits all 
circumstances and is therefore always preferable 
(Zhao, 2000; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005). 
Though asymptotically all PSM estimators should 
yield the same results (Smith, 2000), in small 
samples the choice of matching algorithm can be 
important (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997).
Among many methods allowing the 
assessment of the matching quality of the 
most popular approaches are: i) standardized 
bias (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985); ii) t–
test (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985); iii) joint 
significance and pseudo R² (Sianesi, 2004); or 
iv) stratification tests (Dehejia and Wahba 1999, 
2002). If the quality indicators are not satisfactory, 
one reason might be misspecification of the 
propensity score model (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
2005) or failure of the CIA (Smith and Todd, 2005). 
5.3. Selection of relevant conditioning 
variables
PSM is a suitable technique dealing with 
endogeneity problems in case a rich dataset is 
available and almost all important factors driving 
the potential bias can be observed. Yet, the 
success of matching estimator depends on the 
availability of observable data to construct the 
set Z such as appropriate conditions are satisfied 
(Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd, 1998; 
Todd, 2006). If this not the case and if only a 
subset of Z, i.e. Z0 ε Z is observable, a bias may 
arise in matching. 
As shown in (Todd, 2006) the propensity 
score matching estimator based on Z0 instead of 
Z converges to: 
α’M = EP (Z0)|D=1 (E(Y1|P (Z0), D = 1) − E(Y0|P 
(Z0), D = 0))   (25a) 
The bias for the parameter of interest, E (Y1 − 
Y0|D = 1), is:
Bias M = E (Y0|D = 1) − EP (Z0)|D=1{E(Y0|P 
(Z0), D = 0)}.   (25b) 
As (Todd, 2006) states “there is no way of 
a priori choosing the set of Z variables to satisfy 
the matching condition or of testing whether a 
particular set meets the requirements. In rare 
cases, where data are available on a randomized 
social experiment, it is sometimes possible to 
ascertain the bias”. Heckman; Ichimura, Smith 
and Todd, 1998; Heckman, Ichimura and Todd 
1997; Lechner 2001 argued that estimated bias 
depends on what variables are included in the 
propensity score, and showed that biases tend 
to be higher when the participation equation 
was estimated using a cruder set of conditioning 
variables. Heckman and Navarro-Lozano, 2004 
offered examples where the application of the 
goodness-of-fit criteria advocated in the former 
literature resulted in a selection of conditioning 
sets that generated more bias compared with 
conditioning sets that were less successful 
in terms of the model selection criterion. By 
defining the concepts of relevant information 
set and minimal relevant information set, and 
distinguishing agent and analyst information sets 
Heckman and Navarro-Lozano, 2004 showed 
that when the analyst does not have access to the 
minimal relevant information, matching estimates 
of different treatment parameters are biased. 
Having more information, but not all of the 
minimal relevant information, can increase the 
bias over having less information. Yet, enlarging 
the analyst’s information set with variables that 
do not belong into the relevant information set 
may either increase or decrease the bias from 
matching. While the econometric distinctions 
of exogeneity and endogeneity play crucial 
roles in applications of matching in the choice 
of appropriate conditioning sets, Heckman 
and Navarro-Lozano, 2004 argued in favour of 
the method of control functions that explicitly 
enables the modelling of omitted relevant 
conditioning variables.
The discussion in the literature as to the best 
method to help with the selection of relevant 
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argue that the process of selection can be facilitated 
by using a method suggested by (Rosenbaum 
and Rubin, 1983). The method does not provide 
guidance in choosing which variables to include 
in Z, but can help to determine which interactions 
and higher order terms to include in the model for a 
given Z set (Todd, 2006).The proposed method helps 
to find the correct specification of a propensity score 
model by noting that after conditioning on P(D=1|Z) 
additional conditioning on Z should not provide 
new information about D. On the basis of this 
suggestion various specification tests on P(D=1|Z) 
after conditioning on P(Z) have been developed and 
implemented in the literature (Todd, 2006). 
5.4. Unobserved heterogeneity 
If there are unobserved variables which 
simultaneously affect assignment to treatment and 
outcome a hidden bias may arise. Unobservable 
heterogeneity can substantially affect estimated 
results of programme effects. This can be easily 
illustrated by showing the impact of unobserved 
heterogeneity on the estimated ATE.
Assuming that the rate of unobservable 
heterogeneity does not change in time one can 
distinguish three major cases (Winship and 
Morgan, 1999):
Case 1: Unobserved heterogeneity is neutral 
for both groups (i.e. it does not affect the growth 
rates in both groups differently). Unobserved 
differences between both groups, i.e. units 
which do not participate in the programme (e.g. 
units i) and units which participate (e.g. units j) 
are time invariant or fixed. In the absence of the 
programme, expected growth rates lines would 
be parallel to each other (Graph 1). The estimated 
ATE is unbiased.
Case 2. Unobserved heterogeneity in 
the group of programme participants reduces 
the estimated participation effects. In the 
absence of the programme, the growth rates 
of the outcomes would be different between 
two groups, e.g. growth rate in a group of 
programme participants would be higher 
than in the control group (Graph 2). This may 
occur for example, if the managerial skills 
of programme participants unobserved by 
the econometrician were higher than in the 
group of non-participants. The estimated ATE 
would be biased, without accounting for an 
unobservable heterogeneity.
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Case 3. Unobserved heterogeneity effects 
in the group of programme participants increase 
estimated programme effects. In the absence of 
the programme, the growth rates of outcomes 
would be different between two groups, e.g. the 
growth rate in a group of programme participants 
would be lower than in the group of non-
participants (Graph 3). 
While the propensity score matching 
assumes conditional independencies (CIA) 
to exclude the problem of unobservable 
heterogeneity, in the evaluation literature 
arguments are provided that the 
unconfoundedness assumption holds even 
when two agents/units with the same values for 
observed characteristics differ in their treatment 
choices (participation or non-participation). 
The difference in their choices may be driven 
by differences in unobserved characteristics 
that are themselves unrelated to the outcomes 
of interest (Imbens, 2003). Yet, if there are 
unobserved variables that simultaneously affect 
assignment into the programme and the outcome 
variable, a hidden bias might arise to which 
matching estimators are not robust (Rosenbaum, 
2002; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005; Becker and 
Caliendo, 2007). 
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can be a two-stage estimator (Heckman, 1976) 
that treats unobservable heterogeneity as a 
problem of an omitted variable, and solves this 
problem by including an estimate of the omitted 
variable as a regressor in the outcome equation 
along with the participation dummy and 
individual characteristics21.
In our study the presence of hidden bias is 
formally tested using the approach described 
below in Chapter 5.6. <sensitivity analysis>. 
5.5. Combined PSM and Difference-
in-Differences estimator 
(conditional DID)
As shown above, conventional DID 
methods fail if the impact of unobservables is 
not time-invariant so that a group of programme 
participants and a control group are on different 
development trajectories. The probability of 
different development trajectories increases if 
already at the beginning of the programme the 
observed heterogeneity of both groups (and 
therefore the selection bias) is large. While 
propensity score matching can be applied to 
control for selection bias on observables at the 
beginning of the programme, a combination 
of PSM with DID methods (conditional DID 
estimator) allows for a better controlling 
of selection bias in both observables and 
unobservables. The combined PSM and DID 
method is a highly applicable estimator in case 
the outcome data on programme participants and 
non-participants is available both “before” and 
“after” periods (t’ and t, respectively). The PSM-
21 A recent microeconomic evaluation literature focussed 
on constructing and estimating of models allowing for 
heterogeneity in response to programme participation 
among otherwise observationally identical units. 
Important outcome of these studies is the development 
of a new class of econometric estimators which allow for 
the possibility of selection to treatment (e.g. decision to 
participate in a programme) that is based on unobserved 
components of heterogeneous responses to treatment. 
(Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005).
DID measures the impact of the RD programme 
by using the differences between comparable 
to each other programme participants (D=1) 
and non-participants (D=0) in the before-after 
situations. In this method observed changes over 
time for the matched (using PSM) programme 
non-participants are assumed to be appropriate 
counterfactual for programme participants. 
The simplified notation for PSM-DID 
calculation can be described as follows:
PSM-DID = {Σ (Yit | (D=1) – Yit | (D=0)) – Σ 
(Yit’ | (D=1) – Yit’ | (D=0))}/n   (26a) 
Where:
(Yit | (D=1) – Yit | (D=0)) is the difference in 
mean outcomes between the i participants and 
the i matched comparison units after the access 
to the RD programme and
(Yit’ | (D=1) – Yit’ | (D=0)) is the difference in 
mean outcomes between the i participants and i 
matched comparison units at date 0 (prior to the 
RD programme).
A decisive advantage of the PSM-DID 
estimator (conditional DID estimator), compared 
to a conventional DID estimator, is that by 
applying this methodology, initial conditions 
regarding observable heterogeneity of both groups 
(programme participants and non-participants) 
that could influence subsequent changes over 
time are largely eliminated22. Similarly, an 
application of a conditional DID estimator (PSM-
DID) to the measurement of the effects of a given 
RD programme may greatly improve research 
findings compared with a situation where a 
standard PSM (e.g. for estimation of ATT) that 
uses post-intervention data only is applied.
22 Similar methodology was used by Ravallion, 2004; 
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The following example illustrates a potential 
qualitative difference in results (i.e. a conditional 
DID estimator (ATT-DID) vs. a standard ATT), 
see: Graph 4.
Graph 4. Comparison of ATT with ATT-DID estimator
In the above example (Graph 4) the use of a 
standard ATT estimator (based on post-intervention 
data only) calculated as a difference between 
mean values of a result indicator in the group of 
programme beneficiaries and matched control 
group (Y3-Y2) would have led policy makers to 
conclude incorrectly that the effect of a given 
RD programme was positive (the calculated post 
intervention ATT is higher than zero). Yet, had a 
ATT-DID estimator been applied, the effects of 
a given RD programme would have to be judged 
negatively, i.e. a mean value of a result indicator 
in the group programme beneficiaries remained 
unchanged (Y1) while in the matched control group 
<i.e. without the programme> it increased in the 
examined period <before and after programme> 
from Y1 to Y2 (the calculated ATT-DID estimator is 
negative, i.e. (Y3-Y2) – (Y3-Y1) < 0).
5.6. Sensitivity analysis
5.6.1. Rosenbaum bounding approach
Since estimation of the magnitude of 
selection bias with non-experimental data is 
impossible one possibility to address the issue 
of unobservables is the bounding approach 
proposed by Rosenbaum, 2002. The approach 
allows determining how much hidden bias would 
need to be present to render plausible the null 
hypothesis of no effect (Rosenbaum, 2002) or 
in another words how strongly an unmeasured 
variable must influence the selection process in 
order to undermine the implications of matching 
analysis (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005).
As stated in (Becker and Caliendo, 2007) 
the bounding approach does not test the 
unconfoundedness assumption itself, because 
this would amount to testing that there are 
no (unobserved) variables that influence the 
selection into the programme, but instead this 
approach provides an evidence on the degree 
to which any significance results hinge on this 
untestable assumption.
While an extensive discussion of this 
approach was provided in Rosenbaum, 2002 
an outline of this approach can also be found 
in (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005; Becker and 
Caliendo, 2007).
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participation can be expressed as:
Pi = P(xi, ui) = P (Di=1|xi, ui ) = F (βxi + λui)   (27)
Where: 
Di = equals 1 if an unit i participates in programme
xi = are the observed characteristics for unit i 
ui = the unobserved variable
λ = is the effect of ui on the participation decision
If the study is free of hidden bias, λ will 
be zero and participation probability will be 
determined entirely by effects of xi. However, 
in the presence of hidden bias two matched 
units (with the same observed covariates x) 
will have different chances of programme 
participation. While the odds that both units 
i and j will participate are given by Pi/(1-Pi) 
and Pj/(1-Pj) the odds ratio is equal to [exp 
(βxi + λui)]/ [exp (βxj + λuj)] which in case 
of identical observed covariates (implied by 
matching) reduces (the vector x cancels out) 
to exp {λ (ui-uj)}. Rosenbaum, 2002 showed 
that this implies the following bounds on the 
odds ratio that either of the two matched units 
will participate:
 (28)
If the odds ratio differs, i.e. departs from a 
value of 1 this can only be due to hidden bias. 
In this sense eλ is a measure of the degree of 
departure from a study that is free of hidden bias 
(Rosenbaum, 2002; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005; 
Becker and Caliendo, 2007). Sensitivity analysis 
means therefore examining the bounds on the 
odds ratio for programme participation that lie 
between 1/ eλ and eλ.23 
Sensitivity analysis as above is applied in our 
study using formal (Mantel and Haenszel, 1959) tests 
statistics suggested by (Aakvik, 2001) and described 
in (Becker and Caliendo, 2007). Applications of 
sensitivity analysis can also be found in (Aakvik, 
2001; DiPrete and Gangl, 2004; Caliendo, Hujer 
and Thomsen, 2005; Watson, 2005).
5.6.2. Other sensitivity checks
Sensitivity checks are carried out to test the 
stability of obtained results. Sensitivity checks 
embraced the response of estimated effects from 
programme participation to small changes, e.g. in 
the specification of the propensity score, number 
of selected companies, changes in covariates, 
changes in parameters of balancing properties, etc. 
Given a standardized set of variables describing 
characteristics of agricultural enterprises (e.g. FADN 
data) an important sensitivity test was to find out what 
is a minimal/optimal set of conditional variables to 
be included in estimation of propensity scores.
23 With increasing eλ the bounds move apart reflecting 
uncertainty in test statistics in the presence of unobserved 
hidden bias.
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...6. Estimation of other programme effects
6.1. Micro-economic effects
6.1.1. Deadweight loss effects
In some cases, RD programme support, may 
be mistargeted. Deadweight loss effect occurs if 
a participant of a RD programme (unit-j) would 
undertake a similar investment also without a 
RD programme support (i.e. RD support would 
not change investment behaviour of targeted 
enterprise). Deadweight loss effects can be 
measured using the following result indicators:
•	 investment value (in a given sector/branch/
activity) per farm and year, or (as a second best);
•	 value of inventories (excluding private 
buildings) per farm and year;
Depending on data availability estimation 
of a possible deadweight loss can be carried out 
using two different approaches (Michalek, 2007):
Approach 1:
•	 Identification of RD-programme supported 
units j carrying out investments under 
specific RD measures (e.g. modernisation 
and restructuring of agricultural enterprises);
•	 Identification of a control group k 
(programme non-participants) matching with 
units j (similar distribution of all relevant 
covariates) in the period t’ (i.e. before j’s 
access to the programme);
•	 Identification of units m in the control group 
k (where m is a sub-vector of k) which 
undertook the same of type of investment as 
j (in the period between t’ and t);
•	 Calculation of ATT using data from both 
groups (i.e. j and m) on the basis of DID, 
using one of the matching techniques (i.e. 
kernel method);
It is expected that in case of deadweight loss 
the calculated DID-ATT between above groups (j 
and m) will be close to zero.
Approach 2:
•	 Identification of RD programme supported 
units j carrying out investments under 
specific RD measures (e.g. modernisation 
and restructuring of agricultural enterprises);
•	 Identification of a control group k 
(programme non-participants who were 
in the following period willing to invest24) 
matching with units j (similar distribution of 
all relevant covariates, including a covariate 
showing the current level of investment) 
in the period t’ (i.e. before j’s access to the 
programme);
•	 Using a variable “value of inventories” or 
“value of investment” as a result indicator;
•	 Calculation of DID-ATT using the above 
result indicator and data from both groups 
(i.e. j and k);
It is expected that in case of deadweight 
loss the change in result indicators in the group 
of farms supported from the RD programme 
(between years t and t’) and the control group 
(between years t and t’) will be almost the same, 
24 Some farms (programme non-participants) may not be 
willing to invest due to e.g. lack of farm successor (the 
latter is usually an unobservable, i.e. cannot be derived 
from available FADN data).
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i.e. calculated DID-ATT between the above 
groups (j and k) will be close to zero.
6.1.2. Leverage effects
Leverage effect can be considered as 
important micro-economic consequence of RD 
support. It occurs if public funding (e.g. in form 
of RD programme) induces private spending 
among the programme beneficiaries25. Leverage 
effects can be measured using the following 
result indicators:
•	 Money transfers from farm to farm household 
for living
•	 Money transfers from farm to farm household 
for building of private assets
•	 Money transfers from farm to farm household 
(total)
Calculation of the leverage effect can 
be carried out by taking the following steps 
(Michalek, 2007):
•	 selection of individual units j supported by a 
RD programme
•	 identification of a comparison/control group 
k matching with units j (identical distribution 
of covariates) in the period t’ (i.e. prior to j’s 
access to the programme)
•	 selection of outcome variables (result 
indicators) as proxies for private spending, e.g. 
money transfers from farm to farm households; 
level of private and farm consumption; other 
expenditures, except for those which were 
directly supported by RD projects
25 Obviously, additional private spending should exclude 
specific RD supported activities carried out by programme 
beneficiaries, e.g. supported investments. Had this 
been not a case, the scope of leverage effect would be 
proportional to the co-financed part of the RD project.
•	 calculation of ATT for given outcome 
variables between both groups (i.e. j and 
k) on the basis of DID, using one of the 
matching techniques (i.e. kernel method).
It is expected that in case of a significant 
leverage effect the calculated DID-ATT will be 
positive and significant.
6.2. Macro-economic/general 
equilibrium effects
General equilibrium effects occur when 
a programme affects persons/enterprises 
other than its participants (Smith, 2000). 
The most important possible impacts are the 
substitution effect and the displacement effect 
(Calmfors, 1994). Both effects play usually a 
more important role in the evaluation of large 
programmes than in the evaluation of small 
programmes. Yet, they cause problems for 
programme evaluators because most of the 
partial evaluation methods either miss these 
effects entirely or produce biased results in their 
respect. Due to a possibly negative/positive 
impact on programme non-participants the 
evaluation of a given programme becomes 
more complex. Specifically, standard propensity 
score matching methods assume that outcomes 
for non-participants in the control group are 
not affected by the programme (no general 
equilibrium effects). If general equilibrium 
effects had occurred during the implementation 
of a given RD programme (i.e. between years 
t and t’), i.e. if a given RD programme had a 
substantial impact (positive or negative) on farms 
which did not participate in this programme, 
partial equilibrium evaluation techniques 
such as standard PSM would produce biased 
estimates of programme effects. To overcome 
these problems we propose to use a modified 
approach (i.e. a two stage approach using a 
combination of a modified and a standard 
propensity score matching) which aims to 
achieve unbiased results (see below).
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6.2.1. Substitution effect
Substitution effect belongs to macro-
economic effects. It is normally defined as the 
effect obtained in favour of direct programme 
beneficiaries but at the expense of persons/
farms/unit that do not qualify or participate in 
a given intervention. It occurs if, due to support 
provided from RD programme to units j, available 
resources shift (e.g. due to increase of input 
prices (costs) or decrease of output prices 
(profits), at the detriment of non-supported or 
non-eligible units i (the latter are usually located 
in close neighbourhood of j).
For example, persons employed in units i 
(programme non-participants) become employees 
of programme assisted units j; input/factor prices 
w faced prior to RD programme by units i and j 
increase after supporting of units j; or producer 
prices p available prior to RD programme for units 
i and j decrease after support provided to units 
j. Substitution effect (in contrast to displacement 
effect) is expected to occur only in a direct 
neighbourhood of units j and may influence all 
major outcome indicators, e.g. profits, the level 
of employment, etc.
In some cases, substitution effects may 
have an especially strong impact on units i 
characterised by a dissimilar distribution of 
covariates compared to j, e.g. programme 
support of large companies in rural areas may 
bring about a clear deterioration of situation of 
neighbouring small companies. In this case, 
programme participants may differ markedly 
from non-participants (supported large company 
is surrounded by small ones only) bringing about 
additional problems of using PSM methods (e.g. 
due to insufficient common support regions). 
Should the distribution of propensity score in 
group of supported farms (large) be very different 
from non-supported farms (small) in this situation 
an application of standard matching techniques 
to remove a potential selection bias may not be 
justified and respective adjusted methodologies 
have to be applied.
Substitution effects can be measured using 
the following result indicators:
•	 profit per farm/year;
•	 gross value added per farm/year;
In order to estimate substitution effects of RD 
programme, depending on data availability and 
object of interest, we propose the following two 
approaches (Michalek, 2007):
Approach 1 (e.g. estimation of substitution 
effects on small units located in a close 
neighbourhood of supported (large) units):
•	 identification of units j supported by 
RD programme (using pre-defined 
characteristics, e.g. large companies);
•	 identification of non-supported units m 
located in a close spatial neighbourhood of 
j (closeness of the neighbourhood will be 
identified according to a pre-defined radius r);
•	 identification of non-supported units k 
matched to units j (using pre-defined 
characteristics, e.g. large companies) in 
other locations;
•	 identification of non-supported units n, 
matched to units m located in a close spatial 
neighbourhood of units k (radius r);
•	 redefining units m as “quasi-supported” , i.e. 
D=1;
•	 calculation of ATT between units m and 
units n before and after supporting period, 
given that m units are considered as “quasi-
supported”;
•	 calculation of substitution effects by 
subtracting a difference between ATT 
computed for small units/farms m (i.e. quasi-
supported) and small units/farms n (non-
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supported) in period t and t’ (before and after 
supporting period) using eq. 24;
Note, that units m and units n are expected 
to be differently affected by RD programmes 
which originally was provided only to units j. 
Units m, located in the close neighbourhood 
of supported units j, are expected to be under 
indirect impact of RD support provided for units j 
(quasi-supported), whether units n (located in the 
close neighbourhood of non-supported units k) 
are not expected to be affected by a RD support.
SUB = {Σ (Ymt | (D~1) – Ynt | (D=0)) – Σ (Ymt’ 
| (D~1) – Ynt’ | (D=0))}/n   (29) 
Approach 2: Estimation of substitution effects 
on similar non-supported farms located in regions 
with a high programme intensity/exposure
•	 identification of non-supported units/farms 
m located in a close spatial neighbourhood 
of units j supported by the programme 
(closeness can be identified according to the 
programme intensity of a given region);
•	 identification of non-supported units n, 
matched to units m located in regions 
characterised by a low programme intensity 
(no programme effects on non-supported 
farms in regions characterised by a low 
programme intensity is assumed);
•	 redefining units m as “quasi-supported” , i.e. 
D~1;
•	 calculation of ATT between units m and 
units n before and after supporting period, 
given that m units are considered as “quasi-
supported”;
•	 calculation of substitution effects by 
subtracting a difference between ATT 
computed for small units/farms m (i.e. quasi-
supported) and small units/farms n (non-
supported) in period t and t’ (before and 
after supporting period) using eq. 24;
Should substitution effects be substantial, 
i.e. should all enterprises which did not 
participate in a given RD programme were found 
to be affected by this programme (positively or 
negatively), they would have to be eliminated 
from further PSM analysis. In this case, “true” 
ATTs have to be re-estimated without farms 
(potential controls) considered to be a subject 
to substitution effects. 
6.2.2. Displacement effect
Displacement effect is the programme effect 
that occurs in a programme area at expense of 
another area. It takes place if farms i located in 
one geographical area (ai), which is not a subject 
to RD support, becomes adversely affected by a 
support provided to farms j located in another 
geographically area (aj). For example, due to 
RD support to units j jobs are created in units 
j (located in programme assisted area aj) at the 
detriment of jobs lost in units i located outside of 
the area concerned. 
One of the differences between substitution 
and displacement effects is the location of 
adversely affected units i, compared to units j. In 
case of substitution one expects possible effects 
to occur in the same region (programme area), 
whereas in case of displacement effect resources 
are expected to be shifted from non-supported 
programme areas to supported ones.
Displacement effects can be measured using 
the following results indicators:
•	 employment per farm (in case of a direct 
move of employees from non-supported to 
supported regions);
•	 profits per farm (in case of a move of 
distributors/providers of agricultural inputs 
from non-supported to supported regions);
Calculation of displacement effects can 
be carried out by taking the following steps 
(Michalek, 2007):
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•	 identification of units j supported by the RD 
programme in a specific rural area aj (to be 
defined);
•	 identification of non-supported units k, 
located in the supported area aj, which 
match with units j;
•	 identification of non-supported areas (ai) 
(closeness of the areas ai from areas aj can 
be identified according to a pre-defined 
radius r);
•	 identification of non-supported units m, 
located in the non-supported area ai, which 
match to units j;
•	 calculation of DID-ATT between units j 
and units k as well as between units j and 
units m (e.g. the only difference should be 
location of units k and m) before the support 
and after support, taking into consideration 
selected specific outcome variable, e.g. level 
of employment;
The lack of displacement effects would result 
in similar differences in DID-ATT between units 
j and k compared with j and m (i.e. location of 
units k and m would be considered as irrelevant). 
Generally speaking, and assuming no other general 
equilibrium effects (e.g. substitution effects), the 
greater the difference in DID-ATT between both 
groups (j-m) and (j-k) after the programme, the higher 
the probability that the better performance of units j 
and k located in area aj occurred to the detriment 
of units m located in non-supported areas ai. For 
example, assuming that there is no simultaneous shift 
of employment (e.g. due to substitution effect) from 
farms k to farms j (both located in the supported area 
aj) it can be expected that considerable displacement 
effects would bring about a deterioration of DID-
ATT between j and k compared with j and m (this 
applies both to employment as well as profits as 
result indicator). Should however substitution effects 
also take place at the same time (e.g. a simultaneous 
shift of employment from farms k to farms j (both 
located in the supported area aj) it would be difficult 
to separate one general equilibrium effect from the 
other. 
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7. Other evaluation problems
7.1. Slowly unfolding effects
In case of slowly unfolding programme 
effects the measurement of programme 
results may take place more than once 
(e.g. the measurement of selected result 
indicators can be carried out two or three 
times in subsequent time periods (years) after 
programme support was received). The major 
technical constraint is the data availability 
(many farms/units may drop from the panel 
data base in subsequent years). An important 
methodological restriction is the absence of 
any other major factor additionally influencing 
either supported farms or non-supported 
farms only (e.g. another programme targeting 
previously supported or non-supported farms) 
that started between the finalization of the 
original RD programme and the time the 
results indicators are measured. 
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...8. Overview of the procedure applied for an empirical 
estimation of micro-economic and general equilibrium 
effects of an RD programme
The above evaluation methodology was 
applied to the assessment of RD programmes 
implemented both in new Member States 
(SAPARD programme in Slovakia in years 
2002-2004) as well as old Member States (AFP 
Programme in Germany: Schleswig-Holstein 
in years 2000-2006). In both cases (SAPARD 
and the AFP programme) the assessments of 
programme effects concerned a similar measure, 
i.e. the investment in agricultural farms. 
Due to data constraints, the assessment of 
programme effects of the SAPARD programme 
in Slovakia was limited to direct programme 
results (at a micro-level) only. In case of the AFP 
programme (Schleswig-Holstein in Germany) 
richness of data allowed for an estimation of 
both direct and indirect programme effects 
(including, deadweight loss, substitution and 
displacement effects).
The main analytical steps carried out to 
estimate direct and indirect programme effects 
followed the methodology described in Chapters 
5 and 6. In both cases (Slovakia and Germany) 
the binary propensity score matching was the 
crucial methodology applied to evaluate direct 
and indirect programme results. 
The above evaluation methodology was 
applied in the following steps: 
Firstly, Calculation of individual propensity 
scores. The propensity scores for each 
observation in the supported and the non-
supported sample of producers/enterprises 
were econometrically estimated using the 
predicted values from a standard logit-model. 
The estimated logit model of programme 
participation is a function of all the variables 
in the data describing farm/unit characteristics 
and economic performance that are likely to 
determine both participation and programme 
outcomes. Propensity scores are predicted 
values of the probability of participation 
obtained from the logit regression calculated 
individually for every sampled supported and 
non-supported unit. 
Secondly, Exclusion of non-similar 
enterprises from the control group. Some of 
the supported and non-supported units were 
excluded from further comparisons because 
their propensity scores were outside the range 
calculated for supported units (outside of 
the common support region). Matched pairs 
of producers/enterprises/regions etc. were 
constructed on the basis of how close the 
estimated scores were across the two samples 
(programme participants vs. controls). Out 
of several alternative matching algorithms 
enabling calculation of the average outcome 
indicator of the matched supported and non-
supported groups, ranging from “nearest 
neighbour” to kernel functions (Gaussian or 
Epanechnikov), the “best” matching algorithm 
(given a data base) was selected on the basis 
of three important criteria: minimization of the 
standardized bias (after matching), satisfaction 
of balancing property tests, and satisfaction of 
the pseudo R² test.
Thirdly, Calculation of relevant outcome 
indicators. The mean values of the outcome 
indicator for comparable supported and control 
units were computed using the matching 
algorithm selected above (e.g. Kernel method).
 
Fourthly, Calculation of the most important 
policy parameters. All the most important policy 
parameters, i.e. Average Treatment Effect on 
treated (ATT), average treatment effect (ATE) and 
average treatment effects on non-treated (ATNT) 
were calculated in this step. 
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... Fifthly, Estimation of programme effects. 
Programme effects were computed on the basis 
of the estimated differences between respective 
policy parameters (ATT, ATE, ATNT) prior and 
after finalization of the programme (conditional 
DID method).
Sixthly, Performing sensitivity analysis. The 
sensitivity analysis was carried out in order to 
find out how much hidden bias would need to be 
present to render plausible the null hypothesis of 
no programme effect. 
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...9. Data
Slovakia:
The dataset comprised FADN farm data 
collected for 232 Slovak large agricultural 
companies supported and non-supported through 
the SAPARD programme in the years 2002-2005 
(balanced panel data). 
Schleswig- Holstein, Germany
The main data source used for the assessment 
of the effects of the AFP programme in Schleswig-
Holstein was farm bookkeeping data comprised of 
approximately 10 500 farms for the year 2000/2001 
and 3 900 farms for the year 2007/2008). 
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10. Estimated effects of the SAPARD programme in Slovakia 
10.1. Scope and distribution of 
SAPARD funds under Measure 
1: Investments in agricultural 
enterprises.
The SAPARD support provided under 
Measure 1 primarily targeted the following 
agricultural sectors: a) beef sector, b) pork sector, 
c) sheep sector, d) poultry sector, e) fruits and 
vegetables sector.
The main objectives of this measure were to: 
•	 Assure compliance with EU animal welfare, 
hygiene and environmental requirements;
•	 Increase the labour productivity and improve 
working conditions;
•	 Increase quality of agricultural production;
•	 Increase competitiveness of products and 
producers;
•	 Improve storage and post-harvest 
infrastructure;
•	 Maintain and use the natural potential of the 
country and solve employment problems in 
marginal regions;
Programme support under Measure 1 had 
the form of a capital grant covering up to 50% of 
costs of eligible investments in the above sectors. 
The structure of allocated financial resources 
from the SAPARD programme to individual 
programme measures (1-9) shows that the 
Measure 1 (Investment in agricultural enterprises) 
was the most important single programme activity. 
Indeed, between the years 2002-2004 as much 
as 27.5 Mill EUR or 28% of the total available 
resources under SAPARD programme (97.3 Mill 
EUR) were allocated to Measure 1. After 2004, i.e. 
after Slovakia’s EU accession, the amount of total 
funds (i.e. SAPARD + RDP) allocated to Measure 
1 increased to 32.6 Mill EUR i.e. by additional 
19%. Out of 450 project proposals submitted 
under this measure 343 projects (SAPARD and 
RDP) were contracted and concluded. The major 
share of available funds under Measure 1 was 
spent on the support of investments in the cattle 
sector (34% of funds and 149 projects), followed 
by the fruit sector (23% of funds and 67 projects), 
poultry sector (20% of funds and 57 projects), 
pork sector (18% of funds and 55 projects) and 
sheep sector (5% of funds and 15 projects). The 
major beneficiaries of programme support under 
this measure (receiving approximately 67% of 
funds available under this measure) were large 
agricultural companies located in relatively well-
developed regions of West Slovakia (Nitra, Trnava 
and Bratislava).
At the beginning of the SAPARD 
programme there was a rather slow uptake 
of funds and a low level of participation of 
primary agricultural producers (Measure 1). 
In the case of large agricultural companies, 
this was mainly due to their difficulty in 
meeting the originally strict formal economic 
eligibility criteria, and their problems in 
securing external co-financing of their 
investment projects (50% or more) through 
commercial banking systems (many large 
agricultural companies in Slovakia were 
highly indebted at this time!). In the case of 
small individual firms, agricultural producers 
had problems with the interpretation of 
programme guidelines and were facing huge 
administrative costs for project preparations. 
Given the above situations, during the 
implementation of the SAPARD programme in 
Slovakia numerous changes to the programme 
were undertaken by the Programme Managing 
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Authority (i.e. via amendments to the Rural 
Development Plan) with the aim of facilitating 
the spending of available SAPARD resources. 
Many of these changes were initiated by 
lobbyists of large agricultural/food processing 
enterprises, which at that time, due to the 
overall difficulties in the agricultural sector but 
also due to management inefficiencies, were 
economically too weak to qualify as eligible 
enterprises under the original programme 
conditions. Although many studies pointed 
out that a drastic weakening of programme 
eligibility criteria may have diluted the 
potential impact of the programme, this trend 
was irreversible26. In fact, the distribution of 
funds under Measure 1 shows clearly that at 
that time an important goal of the Managing 
Authorities of the SAPARD programme was to 
strengthen the competitiveness and financial 
condition of large agricultural enterprises (in 
their majority former cooperatives or state 
farms) enabling a relatively smooth transition 
for them from a risky pre-accession period to a 
more stable EU membership (post-accession) 
stage27. 
10.2. Selection of companies
Deficiencies in the SAPARD monitoring 
system (especially problems with a data base 
describing economic performance of small 
individual farms), and a relatively abundant 
amount of data on large agricultural companies 
(part of Slovak FADN) resulted in the focus of 
the assessment of the programme on (large-
sized) agricultural enterprises (average size 
approx 1500 ha). In order to ensure maximum 
comparability between SAPARD supported 
26 Proposed changes were accepted by the EC on the 
presumption that otherwise the programme funds would 
not be spent at all. 
27 After EU accession, a stabilization of the situation for large 
agricultural companies was ensured by taking advantage 
of available direct payments.
and non-supported agricultural companies the 
eligibility issues were explicitly accounted for28. 
The following steps were carried out:
•	 SAPARD beneficiaries were identified 
and selected from the existing FADN data 
bases. Data for each SAPARD beneficiary 
was collected in the years prior to their 
participation in SAPARD and in 2005 (after 
SAPARD).
•	 SAPARD general and specific eligibility 
criteria (e.g. pre-defined farm performance 
coefficients and farm profitability ratios; 
various minimum/maximum production-, 
age-, etc. thresholds; etc.) that were valid 
in individual years were translated into 
respective quantitative coefficients and 
applied to all non-SAPARD units included in 
FADN data bases.
•	 Agricultural companies, which did not 
receive a support from the SAPARD 
programme and which satisfied the above 
participation criteria in years 2002-2005 
were selected as eligible non-participants.
•	 Respective balanced panels (i.e. embracing 
SAPARD beneficiaries and all non-SAPARD 
units that met SAPARD eligibility criteria in 
specific years) were constructed for the years 
2002-2005, i.e. observations on the same 
units in period 2002-2005.
28 Generally speaking, an individual agricultural company 
not participating in the SAPARD programme may 
have chosen not to do so, or may have been ineligible 
(eligibility criteria were set in the programming document 
“Rural Development Plan”). Ideally, supported and non-
supported companies should only differ in their decision 
to participate. Yet, if a company is programme ineligible 
it means that its support (via a given programme) was 
not policy intended because some critical company 
background characteristics (e.g. prior economic 
performance, current capacities, etc.) significantly 
differed from targeted ones. By including ineligible 
programme non-beneficiaries (which markedly differ in 
their background characteristics from eligible firms) into 
the analysis of programme effectiveness the similarity 
(balancing property) between programme beneficiaries 
and the control group would be violated.
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On the basis of the available Slovak FADN 
data base, 232 agricultural companies were 
selected for further analysis (balanced panel 
data), which was performed for the years 2003 
(before SAPARD) and 2005 (after SAPARD)29. 
Of the selected 232 agricultural enterprises 51 
agricultural farms were SAPARD participants 
and 181 farms SAPARD non-participants (yet, 
SAPARD eligible). 
10.3. Differences between the groups 
of programme participants and 
non-participants
A brief analysis of some key characteristics 
of the selected groups of farms (SAPARD 
participants D=1 vs. non-participants D=0) shows 
that these two groups (both SAPARD eligible) 
differed considerably (Table 1).
Table 1. Slovakia: Major characteristics of agricultural companies supported (D=1) and non-supported 
(D=0) from the SAPARD programme (year 2003)
Participation
Own-
land 
in ha
Agric. 
Land 
used
in ha
Employment 
(persons)
Value of 
assets 
(buildings) in 
SKK (1000)
Value of 
assets 
(machinery 
and others) 
in SKK 
(1000)
Value of asset 
(livestock) in 
SKK (1000)
Profit 
in SKK 
(1000) 
Profit 
per ha 
in SKK 
(1000)
D=0 (181) 870 1439 64 34747 8604 3492 -3338 -2.318
D=1 (51) 1507 1930 77 46154 14939 4709 -880 -0.456
Agricultural companies which received 
support from the SAPARD programme were 
generally much larger (ha), they employed 
more people and were more profitable (i.e. less 
unprofitable) compared with those agricultural 
companies which were non-supported.
10.4. Estimation of a logit function
10.4.1. Selection of covariates 
Given the individual characteristics of 
agricultural companies (programme participants 
vs. programme non-participants), propensity 
scores (i.e. the conditional probability of a farm’s 
participation in the SAPARD programme) were 
estimated for all selected enterprises using a logit 
function.
29 All selected beneficiaries received support from SAPARD in 
year 2004. Unfortunately, inclusion of the following years 
(2006 and 2007) was not possible due to dropping of many 
former agricultural companies from the data panel.
Since the matching strategy builds on 
the Conditional Independence Assumption 
(CIA) requiring that outcome variables must 
be independent of support conditional on the 
propensity score, the selection of variables 
into the logit function (also) has to meet these 
requirements. Generally, covariates entering 
the logit function are expected to determine 
both programme participation and outcomes 
(the latter are typically measured in terms 
of relevant result indicators at micro-level). 
Given that only variables that are unaffected by 
programme participation (including anticipation 
of participation) can be included into the model, 
the selection of covariates from a given set of 
available characteristics (FADN data) can in 
principle be carried out using two methods:
a. relying on experts choice (based on economic 
theory and some empirical evidence)
b. relying on statistical significance (by iteratively 
adding new variable to specification)
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In our study these two approaches were 
combined. This was done in three major steps:
Firstly, on the basis of expert knowledge 
the long-list of the most crucial variables 
determining both participation and outcomes 
was constructed, using the entire Slovak FADN 
data set. This activity resulted in a pre-selection 
of ca. 400 out of approximately 7400 potential 
variables and categories.
Secondly, the most important statistically 
significant variables (out of the pre-selected 
400) which simultaneously satisfied balancing 
property tests were selected as relevant covariates 
in the estimated logit function. This was done by 
applying an iterative procedure (by iteratively 
adding new variables to the logit specification) 
whereby respective balancing property tests 
were carried out given imposed common support 
conditions.
Table 2. Slovakia. List of selected variables 
List if variables
v2b364y03 Profit per company
vd37a23 Number of pigs for fattening
vh 72 Liabilities
vk61 Initial stock wheat
vf331 Costs of interest paid
vd37a20 Stock of other sheep
v1b541 Assets total non-current receivables
vc39 Employment (manual workers)
vk69 Initial stock beans, peas, etc.
vk85 Production of oat
vk665 Initial stock of grass and hay in haylage
vf323 Overhead costs (water)
vf335 Costs of interest and fees (total)
v1b52 Net value of current assets
v2b340 Interest income
v2b31 Revenue from sale of merchandise
vf311 Costs of own feedstuff for pigs
vk865 Production of grass and hay
vd37a4 Stock of heifers and bulls for fattening (6–12 months)
vd37a6 Stock of bulls for fattening (1-2 years)
v3b66 Land area hired from others (grass land and pastures)
vf35 Costs of cars
vc32 Employment (directors, chairmen, representatives, etc.)
vk813 Production of industrial potatoes for starch
v1b586 Total liabilities (external sources)
v2b325 Other operating income
vb2a3111 Costs of consulting and services
vk873 Production of grapes for wine
vc37 Employment (tractor drivers and mechanics)
v2b324 Value adjustment against operating expenses
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Thirdly, step two was supplemented by an 
obligatory selection of those variables thought 
as critical for comparability of economic 
performance across agricultural companies (i.e. 
profit per company).30
By using this method 30 variables were 
selected that appeared statistically as the most 
significant and simultaneously satisfied the 
balancing property tests. The list of selected 
variables is given in Table 2. 
10.4.2. Estimation results
The results of logit estimation (SAPARD 
Measure-1) are shown in Tab 3. 
Table 3. Slovakia: Results of estimation of logit function
particip Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
v2b364y03 .0025436 .0008284 3.07 0.002 .0009199 .0041673
vd37a23y03 .0073994 .0027669 2.67 0.007 .0019763 .0128224
vh72y03 .0024133 .0007507 3.21 0.001 .0009421 .0038846
vk61y03 -.0179229 .0061878 -2.90 0.004 -.0300509 -.005795
vf331y03 -.0121055 .0038116 -3.18 0.001 -.0195761 -.004635
vd37a20y03 -.0289665 .0103319 -2.80 0.005 -.0492167 -.0087162
v1b541y03 -.0066384 .0024064 -2.76 0.006 -.0113549 -.0019219
vc39y03 -.6308535 .1907164 -3.31 0.001 -1.004651 -.2570562
vk69y03 .1495759 .0472736 3.16 0.002 .0569214 .2422304
vk85y03 -.069111 .0241572 -2.86 0.004 -.1164583 -.0217636
vk665y03 .0048039 .0015541 3.09 0.002 .0017579 .0078499
vf323y03 -.0386929 .0130836 -2.96 0.003 -.0643363 -.0130496
vf335y03 .0003901 .0001232 3.17 0.002 .0001485 .0006316
v1b52y03 -.1539366 .068769 -2.24 0.025 -.2887213 -.0191519
v2b340y03 .0343233 .0116338 2.95 0.003 .0115216 .0571251
v2b31y03 -.0016953 .0005189 -3.27 0.001 -.0027123 -.0006783
vf311y03 .001743 .0006322 2.76 0.006 .0005038 .0029822
vk865y03 .0029226 .000914 3.20 0.001 .0011311 .0047141
vd37a4y03 -.2366995 .0723047 -3.27 0.001 -.3784141 -.0949848
vd37a6y03 -.0293615 .0096498 -3.04 0.002 -.0482749 -.0104482
v3b66y03 -.0073581 .0025647 -2.87 0.004 -.0123848 -.0023315
vf35y03 -.0188592 .0061192 -3.08 0.002 -.0308527 -.0068657
vc32y03 -7.00138 2.474549 -2.83 0.005 -11.85141 -2.151352
vk813y03 .0100983 .0040284 2.51 0.012 .0022029 .0179938
v1b586y03 -.0002031 .0000718 -2.83 0.005 -.0003439 -.0000623
v2b325y03 .0004984 .0001745 2.86 0.004 .0001564 .0008405
vb2a3111y03 .0030658 .001674 1.83 0.067 -.0002152 .0063468
vk873y03 -.0281685 .013879 -2.03 0.042 -.0553709 -.0009661
vc37y03 .6128139 .1969328 3.11 0.002 .2268328 .998795
v2b324y03 -.0139305 .005634 -2.47 0.013 -.0249729 -.0028881
_cons -7.079863 2.091144 -3.39 0.001 -11.17843 -2.981296
Logistic 
regression
Number of obs LR chi2(30) Prob > chi2 Log likelihood Pseudo R2
=   232 =   194.98 =   0.0000 =   -24.703442 =   0.7978
30 Selection of this variable to the logit function was done 
after having verified that balancing property tests were 
satisfactory. 
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In the next step, the results of a logit function 
estimation were used to derive for all agricultural 
companies their individual probability 
(propensity scores) of receiving support from the 
SAPARD programme (Measure 1). 
10.4.3. Selection of a matching algorithm
In order to ensure comparability, the 
estimated propensity scores of agricultural 
companies - programme participants (SAPARD, 
Measure 1) and their controls should be similar. 
As the probability of observing two units with 
exactly the same value of the propensity score 
is in principle zero (since p(Z) is a continuous 
variable), the estimation of programme results 
(ATT) requires the use of appropriate matching 
algorithms. The latter set up the measure 
of proximity thus enabling the definition of 
programme non-participants who are acceptably 
close (e.g. in terms of the propensity score) to 
any given programme participant. To avoid a 
lack of comparable units we restricted matching 
and hence estimation of the effect of programme 
participation to the region of common support. 
The most commonly used matching 
algorithms involving the propensity score are: 
Nearest Neighbour Matching, Radius Matching, 
Stratification Matching and Kernel Matching 
(Cochran and Rubin, 1973; Dehejia and Wahba, 
1999; Heckman, Ichimura and Todd. 1997, 
1998; Heckman; Ichimura, Smith and Todd, 
1998). While asymptotically all PSM matching 
techniques should yield the same results, the 
choice of the matching method (or applied 
matching parameters, e.g. number of nearest 
neighbours, radius magnitude, kernel type, etc.) 
can make a difference in small samples (Smith, 
2000)31. As the quality of a given matching 
technique depends heavily on the data set, the 
selection of a relevant matching technique in our 
study was carried out using three independent 
criteria: i) standardized bias (Rosenbaum and 
31 Description of trade-offs linked to each of matching 
algorithms can be found in (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005).
Rubin, 1985); ii) t–test (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1985); and iii) joint significance and pseudo R² 
(Sianesi, 2004).
We found that the best results were achieved 
by using an iterative procedure (e.g. linear search) 
aiming at the minimization of the calculated 
standardized bias32 (after matching) and applying 
min{min} as the main selection criterion. In all 
considered cases (various matching algorithms)33 
an optimal solution could easily be found due to 
local/global convexity of the objective function 
with respect to functional parameters characterizing 
each matching algorithm (e.g. radius magnitude in 
radius matching; or number of nearest neighbours 
in nearest neighbour matching). An overview of the 
results obtained using different matching algorithms 
is provided in Table 4.
Although in our example all matching 
algorithms lead to qualitatively similar results, 
i.e. irrespective of the matching algorithms used 
the estimated programme effects (obtained by 
using conditional DID, i.e. combining PSM and 
a traditional DID method) were found to be 
negative, the best results (the lowest bias) were 
obtained by employing kernel Epanechnikov 
matching (bandwidth 0.06).
The application of the above procedure and 
the imposition of common support restrictions 
resulted in dropping from further analysis 37 
programme supported agricultural enterprises 
thus selecting 14 comparable (out of total 51) 
programme participants and 181 programme non-
participants as relevant counterparts (Table 5).
32 The standardized bias is the difference of the sample 
means in the treated and non-treated (full or matched) 
sub-samples as a percentage of the square root of the 
average of the sample variances in the treated and non-
treated groups (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). 
33 This does not apply to local linear weighting function 
matching which first smoothes the outcome and then 
performs nearest neighbour matching. In this case more 
controls are used to calculate the counterfactual outcome 
than the nearest neighbor only (Leuven and Sianesi, 2007).
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a Table 4. Slovak agricultural companies: Selection of matching algorithm Profit/ha. Difference in Differences 
(DID) of Average Treatment Effects on Treated (ATT): Leuven – Sianesi Method (2007)
Matching 
algorithms
ATT
DID
(2003-2005)
Estimated 
standardized 
bias
 (after matching)
% bias reduction
2003 2005
Nearest neighbours
N ( 1 )
0.119 -0.001 -0.12 9.6 51%
Nearest neighbours
N ( 5 )
-0.314 -0.486 -0.172 10.7 45%
Radius caliper
(max distance 
0.01 )
0.558 -0.463 -1.021 19.75 0%
Kernel gaussian -0.139 -0.333 -0.194 9.01 54%
Kernel biweight -0.009 -0.338 -0.329 7.51 61%
Kernel 
epanechnikov 
bandwidth 0.01
0.579 -0.446 -1.025 19.61 0%
Kernel 
epanechnikov 
bandwidth 0.06
0.0165 -0.345 -0.3615 7.45 62%
Kernel 
epanechnikov 
bandwidth 0.1
-0.185 -0.316 -0.131 9.06 54%
Kernel 
epanechnikov 
bandwidth 0.2
-0.125 -0.376 -0.251 9.14 53%
Table 5. Selection of Slovak agricultural companies: Results of applying Kernel method (Epanechnikov bw. 
0.06) and imposing common support constraints
Treatment
assignment
Common support
Total
Off support On support
Untreated
Treated
0
37
181
14
181
51
Total 37 195 232
The balancing property tests (t-test)34 
show that the applied matching procedure (i.e. 
minimization of the standardized selection 
bias using kernel epanechnikov matching (bw. 
0.06) considerably improved the comparability 
of both groups of agricultural companies, 
making a counterfactual analysis more realistic. 
Indeed, previously existing (i.e. prior to the 
SAPARD programme) significant differences 
34 According to some authors, conventional t-tests are 
fallacious, see: Imai K, G. King and E. A. Stuart, 2006.
(measured in terms of the t-test) in variables 
between the group of agricultural companies 
supported from the SAPARD programme (D=1) 
and the group of non-supported farms (D=0) 
dropped after matching (differences became 
no more statistically significant). This applies 
to all important variables determining both 
programme participation and outcomes, e.g. 
profit per company (prior to the SAPARD 
programme), liabilities, value of current assets, 
etc. Results of performed balancing property 
tests are shown in Table 6.
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...Table 6. Slovakia: Variables’ balancing property test between selected programme supported and non-
supported agricultural companies (common support imposed; matching algorithm: kernel 
epanechnikov bw 0.06)
Mean % Reduction t-test
Variable Sample Treated Control %bias bias t p>  t
v2b364y03 Unmatched -880.9 -3338.6 45.4 2.66 0.008
Matched -1705 -1264.7 -8.1 82.1 -0.33 0.747
vd37a23y03 Unmatched 915.37 437.93 50.6 3.92 0.000
Matched 419.07 415.75 0.4 99.3 0.02 0.982
vh72y03 Unmatched 16566 837.97 23.8 2.27 0.024
Matched 968.21 1405.6 -0.7 97.2 -0.57 0.575
vk61y03 Unmatched 376.65 17192 -10.6 -0.53 0.594
Matched 301.44 1670.1 -0.9 91.9 -0.07 0.941
vf331y03 Unmatched 632.78 450.09 15.0 1.15 0.253
Matched 200.36 261.16 -5.0 66.7 -0.48 0.636
vd37a20y03 Unmatched 47.348 97.28 -31.4 -1.84 0.067
Matched 88.409 84.811 2.3 92.8 0.06 0.955
v1b541y03 Unmatched 97.431 475.04 -27.4 -1.46 0.146
Matched -6.3571 73.567 -5.8 78.8 -0.51 0.614
vc39y03 Unmatched 3.0784 4.9227 -21.0 -1.10 0.273
Matched 1.5714 2.4112 -9.6 54.5 -0.51 0.612
vk69y03 Unmatched 16.363 8.2929 19.1 1.18 0.240
Matched 7.5964 2.0118 13.2 30.8 0.63 0.532
vk85y03 Unmatched 49.065 46.904 2.0 0.13 0.897
Matched 32.857 25.141 7.3 -257.0 0.36 0.724
vk665y03 Unmatched 116.43 50.691 15.1 1.24 0.215
Matched 66.091 109.32 -9.9 34.2 -0.38 0.707
vf323y03 Unmatched 253.1 219.91 8.0 0.49 0.622
Matched 131.07 158.77 -6.7 16.5 -0.36 0.721
vf335y03 Unmatched 78538 52723 46.7 3.32 0.001
Matched 54635 47188 13.5 71.1 0.54 0.595
v1b52y03 Unmatched .54902 16.901 -16.2 -0.82 0.415
Matched .71429 1.4052 -0.7 95.8 -0.06 0.953
v2b340y03 Unmatched 168.78 53.249 41.3 3.41 0.001
Matched 59.786 33.8 9.3 77.5 0.87 0.390
v2b31y03 Unmatched 1845.7 1954.5 -1.8 -0.10 0.920
Matched 1008.9 611.53 6.5 -265.3 0.32 0.749
vf311y03 Unmatched 3967.3 2227.8 36.6 2.48 0.014
Matched 2203.4 1393.9 17.0 53.5 0.89 0.384
vk865y03 Unmatched 1522.7 1249.7 12.1 0.84 0.401
Matched 1183.4 1022.9 7.1 41.2 0.24 0.809
vd37a4y03 Unmatched 7.3876 8.8968 -6.3 -0.36 0.716
Matched 2.4307 1.1453 5.4 14.8 0.42 0.675
vd37a6y03 Unmatched 62.847 57.025 5.1 0.31 0.757
Matched 56.791 35.997 18.2 -257.2 0.76 0.454
v3b66y03 Unmatched 619.8 733 -11.7 -0.79 0.432
Matched 493.18 474.28 1.9 83.3 0.09 0.929
vf35y03 Unmatched 174.25 114.41 17.4 1.27 0.205
Matched 191.43 101.49 26.2 -50.3 0.59 0.563
vc32y03 Unmatched .52941 .54144 -2.4 -0.15 0.880
Matched .57143 .50006 14.2 -493.5 0.36 0.723
vk813y03 Unmatched 115.66 85.037 9.0 0.63 0.531
Matched 59.897 43.774 4.8 47.0 0.24 0.810
v1b586y03 Unmatched 28991 21514 24.9 1.86 0.064
Matched 21105 19280 6.1 75.6 0.29 0.771
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10.5. Result indicators
Generally speaking, the assessment of the 
micro-economic effects of a given RD programme 
can be carried out using various farm-specific 
economic coefficients as result indicators. 
In our study, we selected seven relevant 
result indicators available from a standard FADN 
system:
•	 Profit per company;
•	 Profit per ha;
•	 Profit per person employed;
•	 Gross value added per company;
•	 Employment per company;
•	 Labour productivity (Gross value added per 
employed);
•	 Land productivity (Gross value added per ha);
In order to measure the effect of the SAPARD 
programme on agricultural companies which 
received support from the SAPARD programme 
(Measure 1) the ATT (Average Treatment on the 
Treated) coefficients were estimated for each 
result indicator separately at two data points: 
before the programme (year 2003) and after 
the programme (2005)35. The outcomes of ATT 
estimations for individual result indicators are 
shown in Tab 7 (below)36.
10.6. Assessment of programme results
The assessment of results of SAPARD 
(Measure 1) on profit, employment, gross value 
added, etc. of agricultural companies that were 
supported by the programme was carried out 
by applying the conditional DID method (i.e. 
combination of a binary PSM method and DID 
technique) to ATT parameters calculated for 
respective result indicators (a-g) before and after 
the programme (years 2003-2005).
10.6.1. Estimation of SAPARD’s impact using a 
traditional approach 
Evaluation studies which employed naïve 
or traditional techniques for an estimation of 
35 Unfortunately, the estimation of ATT in consecutive years 
(e.g. 2006, 2007) was not possible due to a growing 
fluctuation in the data base (dropping of many agricultural 
companies from the balanced panel).
36 Estimated values of ATT in years 2001, 2003 and 2005 
were used for calculation of SAPARD results separately 
for each outcome indicator. The ATT-DID estimator 
measures the impact of the RD programme by comparing 
the differences between programme participants and 
non-participants before (i.e. years 2001 and 2003) and 
after (i.e. 2005) situations. Specifically, the difference 
“one” was the difference in mean outcomes between the 
programme beneficiaries and the matched controls after 
implementation of the RD programme (T1), the difference 
“two” was the difference in mean outcomes between 
beneficiaries and matched controls at date T0 (prior to 
the RD programme) and the difference “three” was the 
difference between difference “one” and difference “two”.
v2b325y03 Unmatched 9643.1 8049.8 22.4 1.52 0.130
Matched 6506.1 7037.4 -7.5 66.7 -0.36 0.723
vb2a3111y03 Unmatched 410.9 352.56 10.2 0.64 0.520
Matched 393.43 353.86 6.9 32.2 0.21 0.832
vk873y03 Unmatched 17.239 46.913 -20.0 -1.03 0.304
Matched 36.708 47.799 -7.5 62.6 -0.32 0.752
vc37y03 Unmatched 18.431 14.337 29.2 1.92 0.057
Matched 13.643 13.581 0.4 98.5 0.02 0.987
v2b324y03 Unmatched 145.22 162.58 -2.6 -0.17 0.867
Matched 17.643 13.153 0.7 74.1 0.08 0.935
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programme effects found a very high impact 
of SAPARD on the performance of agricultural 
enterprises37. In a traditional (naive) approach 
to evaluation, the effects of a given programme 
are often calculated using data on supported 
companies before and after the programme. 
Application of this approach in the context of the 
SAPARD programme would indicate that the effect 
of SAPARD was very positive (e.g. an increase 
in profits per company from -800 thousand SKK 
in 2003 to 1589 thousand in 2005, i.e. a gain of 
2496 thousand SKK; an increase in profits per 
person employed from -11.3 thousand SKK to 23.6 
thousand SKK, i.e. a gain of 34.6 thousand SKK; 
or an increase in profits per ha +1.336 thousand 
SKK).38 Yet, since these approaches completely 
ignore possible effects of other confounding 
factors (exogenous to the SAPARD programme) 
they are certainly not reliable.
Indeed, already a simple comparison with 
non-participants (1-0) or a country average (1-Ø) 
as control groups would in the case of a result 
indicator: “profits per company” or “profit per 
person” lead to completely different results, i.e. 
would indicate only a slightly positive or almost 
negligible effect of the SAPARD programme (3.5-
4 thousand SKK per person or -30 thousand SKK 
per agricultural company). Yet, due to a significant 
selection bias involved even these calculations 
would be problematic.
37 Ex-post evaluation of the SAPARD programme in the Slovak 
Republic. Final Report. P.C.M. Group. December 2007.
38 Results of other evaluation studies that used traditional 
approach were even more peculiar. For example, the 
answer of “traditional” evaluators on one of many 
CEQ, e.g. “To what extent have supported investments 
contributed to improvement of the income of beneficiary 
farmers”? was as follows: “The average salary in the 
agricultural sector increased from 10958 SKK in 2003 
to 13 340 SKK in 2006, i.e. nominally by 30.9%. ... 
It is logical to assume that the growth of income of 
beneficiaries was at least the same, more than likely even 
higher”. Following, “the impact of the implementation of 
Measure 1 Investments in agricultural enterprises was … 
excellent” (PCM, 2007).
10.6.2. PSM-DID approach
The PSM-DID approach largely eliminates 
selection bias, thus making comparisons between 
supported and control groups more reliable. The 
PSM-DID results (presented in Table 7) show 
clearly that the impact of the SAPARD programme 
(Measure 1) on total profits per company and 
value added of supported agricultural companies 
was very different from those estimated by the ex-
post SAPARD evaluators using naive approach 
(PCM, 2007). Indeed, our estimates show 
that profits per company in the matched non-
supported group of similar agricultural companies 
increased from -1264 in 2003 to 815 thousand 
SKK in 2005 (that is by +2079 thousand SKK), i.e. 
they grew faster than in the matched supported 
group (+1836 thousand SKK). Subsequently, the 
effect of SAPARD (measured in terms of this result 
indicator) was found to be either negative (-243 
thousand SKK, profit per company or -346 SKK per 
ha) or close to zero (profit per person employed). 
Similar effects were found by applying 
other result indicators: i.e. gross value added 
per company, gross value added per employed 
person and gross value added per ha. Indeed, 
while gross value added per company, GVA per 
person employed and GVA per ha in the matched 
non-supported agricultural companies increased 
between 2003 and 2005 in supported companies 
they either decreased (e.g. GVA per company, 
labour productivity) or increased at a lower 
rate compared with matched non-beneficiaries 
(e.g. land productivity). As a consequence the 
estimated effect of SAPARD on the above result 
indicators in the examined period was found to 
be either almost zero (GVA per employed) or 
negative (GVA per company and GVA per ha). 
Concerning the impact of SAPARD 
(Measure 1) on farm employment (see Table 9), 
we found that, contrary to some expectations, 
the total employment in the group of supported 
agricultural companies remained at the same 
level over the period of 2003-2005, i.e. 53 
persons per company (employment in analysed 
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a Table 7. Slovakia: Effect of SAPARD (Measure 1) on supported agricultural companies  using profit as result 
indicator (PSM-DID method)
Profit/company
Tsd. SKK
Profit/person employed Profit/ha
2003 2005
DID
(2005-
003)
2003 2005
DID
(2003-
2005)
2003 2005
DID
(2003-
2005)
Participants (1) -880 1589 +2496 -11 23.6 34.6 -0.456 0.91 1.366
Non-participants 
(0)
-3338 -839 +2499 -42 -11 31 -2.32 -0.51 1.81
Country Average Ø -2798 -305 +2493 -35 -3.9 31.1 -1.91 -0.19 1.72
Difference (1-0) 2458 2428 -30 31 35 4 1.86 1.42 -0.44
Difference (1- Ø) 1918 1894 -24 24 27.5 3.5 1.454 1.1 -0.354
Matched 
participants (1)
-1705 131 + 1836 -30.8 7.8 38.6 -1.112 0.21 1.322
Matched control 
group  (0)
-1264 815 + 2079 -19.3 19 38.3 -1.128 0.54 1.668
ATT -440 -683 -243 -11.5 -11.2 0.3 0.016 -0.33 0.346
Table 8. Slovakia: Effect of SAPARD (Measure 1) on supported agricultural companies using GVA as result 
indicator (PSM-DID method)
GVA/company
Labour productivity
(GVA/employed)
Land productivity (GVA/
ha)
2003 2005
DID
(2005-
003)
2003 2005
DID
(2003-
2005)
2003 2005
DID
(2003-
2005)
Participants (1) 17727 18478 751 222 216 -6 10.6 11.5 0.9
Non-participants (0) 9950 9680 -270 130 150 20 7.2 6.6 -0.6
Country Average Ø 11660 11614 -46 151 164 13 7.9 7.7 0.2
Difference (1-0) 7777 8798 1021 92 66 -26 3.4 4.9 1.5
Difference (1- Ø) 6067 6864 797 71 52 -19 2.7 3.8 1.1
Matched participants (1) 11082 9610 -1472 206 147 -59 7.31 7.41 0.1
Matched control group (0) 9367 9701 334 164 168 4 6.85 7.13 0.28
ATT 1715 -90 -1805 41.4 -21.3 -62.7 0.46 0.28 0.18
companies did not decrease), whereas in 
comparable non-supported companies it 
dropped slightly (from 59 to 56 per company). 
As a consequence, the estimated effect of 
SAPARD on employment was found to be 
slightly positive. 
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Sensitivity analysis 
A sensitivity analysis was carried out 
using the Rosenbaum bounding approach 
methodology described in Chapter 5.6. The 
results show that estimated effects of the 
SAPARD programme are rather sensitive 
concerning the presence of unobservables 
(hidden bias). For example, in the case of the 
estimated effect of the SAPARD programme 
on labour productivity the sensitivity analysis 
shows that an increase of the odds ratio 
due to a hidden bias from 1 to 1.05 (by 5%) 
would make the obtained results statistically 
insignificant. The relatively high sensitivity of 
obtained results may originate from a small 
number of observations available in an existing 
data base. Still, even in the presence of high 
sensitivity, the results obtained using the PSM-
DID method are valid.
Table 9. Slovakia: Effect of SAPARD (Measure 1) on supported agricultural companies using employment as 
result indicator (PSM-DID method)
Calculation basis
Employment total (per company)
2003 2005 D I D (2005-2003)
Unmatched P=1 85 82 -3
Unmatched P=0 68 57 -11
Average Ø 84 62 -22
Difference (1-0) 17 25 8
Difference (1- Ø) 1 20 19
Matched M= 1 53 53 0
Matched M= 0 59 56 -3
ATT -5.53 -3.32 2.21
Table 10. Rosenbaum bounds for labour productivity (2003) (N = 14 matched pairs)
Gamma sig+ sig- t-hat+ t-hat- CI+ CI-
1 .099061 .099061 34.8851 34.8851 -11.4305 91.8209
1.05 .113737 .085702 31.997 37.9813 -13.1665 92.5384
1.1 .128973 .074159 31.0288 38.8525 -13.9887 101.065
1.15 .144672 .064185 29.4552 39.555 -19.4491 101.802
1.2 .160743 .055566 29.1089 40.2927 -21.9205 105.29
1.25 .177104 .048115 28.5916 42.2066 -22.9366 113.308
1.3 .193678 .041673 28.2868 43.7802 -23.6743 114.352
1.35 .210399 0.36102 27.4646 46.8034 -25.408 115.78
1.4 .227204 .31283 26.1201 47.3787 -26.1457 115.926
1.45 .244039 .027114 18.1015 47.6255 -26.1457 115.926
1.5 .260856 .023506 16.3578 47.6255 -29.9391 117.5
1.55 .277611 .020382 14.614 48.1164 -32.2005 123.75
1.6 .294268 0.17677 13.8763 50.2252 -32.2005 123.75
1.65 .310794 .015335 12.963 50.5136 -33.4266 125.323
1.7 .327159 .013305 10.4916 51.6039 -34.1643 133.147
1.75 .34334 .011547 10.4916 51.6039 -34.1643 133.147
1.8 .359315 .010023 10.0749 51.7989 -34.6719 133.992
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10.6.3. Possible explanations of obtained results
The possible explanations for the PSM-DID 
results are as follows:
•	 The period covered in the analysis of programme 
impact could be too short to allow for a full 
unfolding of effects of an investment process 
supported under the SAPARD programme. Yet, 
the deterioration of a stability of the balanced 
panel (the drop of many enterprises from 
the data base after inclusion of a new year) 
prevented estimation of programme effects for 
subsequent years (after 2006).
•	 Effects of the SAPARD programme on the 
big agricultural companies in Slovakia were 
indeed less encouraging than expected, 
mainly due to a progressive admission of less 
economically viable agricultural companies 
to the programme (during implementation of 
the SAPARD programme the official eligibility 
criteria (participation criteria) were adjusted 
several times to enable larger but less efficient 
agricultural companies to benefit from 
available EU subsidies, see: 10.1).
•	 Clearly the PSM-DID results show that 
traditional estimates of programme effects can 
1.85 .375067 .008701 9.25277 52.6966 -34.6719 133.992
1.9 .390579 .007555 9.25277 52.6966 -36.9142 134.814
1.95 .405839 .006562 7.60353 54.2703 -36.9142 134.814
2 .420837 .0057 7.60353 59.6225 -37.6519 137.702
2.05 .435564 .004952 6.78136 59.6225 -37.6519 137.702
2.1 .450013 .004303 5.35012 62.0939 -38.3895 153.33
2.15 .46418 .003739 5.35012 62.0939 -38.3895 153.33
2.2 .478061 .00325 2.47301 66.1422 -42.6905 177.435
2.25 .491653 .002825 2.473 66.1422 -42.6905 177.435
2.3 .504954 .002456 -.415091 70.9084 -42.6905 177.435
2.35 .517965 .002136 -.415093 70.9084 -46.178 179.009
2.4 .530685 .001858 -1.01453 71.7306 -46.178 179.009
2.45 .543116 .001616 -1.01454 71.7306 -46.178 179.009
2.5 .55526 .001406 -1.1259 72.1063 -46.9157 186.833
2.55 .567118 .001223 -1.23726 72.4821 -46.9157 186.833
2.6 .578694 .001064 -1.23726 72.4821 -46.9157 186.833
2.65 .589992 .000926 -1.75221 73.3042 -55.4419 240.519
2.7 .601013 .000806 -1.75222 73.3042 -55.4419 240.519
2.75 .611763 .000701 -2.82742 73.9615 -55.4419 240.519
2.8 .622246 .000611 -3.90263 74.6187 -55.4419 240.519
2.85 .632465 .000532 -3.90263 74.6187 -99 99
2.9 .642426 .000463 -4.64031 76.1923 -99 99
2.95 .652132 .000403 -4.64031 76.1923 -99 99
3 .66159 .000351 -4.64031 76.1923 -99 99
* gamma - log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors
sig+ - upper bound significance level
sig- - lower bound significance level
t-hat+ - upper bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate
t-hat- - lower bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate
CI+ - upper bound confidence interval (a= .95)
CI- - lower bound confidence interval (a= .95).
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be highly misleading, and that the application 
of advanced evaluation methodologies 
leads usually to much more reliable results. 
Yet, if the available data base is weak (e.g. 
a low number of observations and a high 
instability of balanced panel data) even a 
more sophisticated approach cannot provide 
all answers to relevant evaluation questions. 
The main problems that occurred in applying 
a PSM-DID method to a rather weak data on 
agricultural enterprises in Slovakia appear to be 
as follows:
Firstly, in case of a low number of 
observations, setting common support conditions 
reduces the estimation of programme effects to a 
relatively small number of agricultural companies 
that received support from the SAPARD (included 
in our data base). Yet, a relatively narrow common 
support region can create some problems if 
obtained results are to be extrapolated to the 
whole population of supported enterprises,
Secondly, analysis of slowly unfolding 
impacts, i.e. estimation of ATT in consecutive 
years after investment (e.g. 2006, 2007) was 
not possible due to progressing fluctuations 
in the available data base (a dropping of many 
agricultural companies from the balanced panel).
Thirdly, a weak data base (small number 
of observations in panel FADN data base) also 
hindered the estimation of programme impacts 
involving general equilibrium effects (e.g. 
substitution or displacement effects).
All of the methodological problems above 
could be addressed in a satisfactory manner 
in our next example: the AFP programme in 
Schleswig-Holstein, Germany. 
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.. 11. Estimation of programme direct and indirect effects 
in the example of the AFP programme in Schleswig-
Holstein (Germany)
11.1. Description of the programme
The main objective of the 
Agrarinvestitionsförderungsprogramm (AFP) 
implemented in the region of Schleswig-
Holstein (Germany) during the years 2000-
2006 was to improve the structure and 
competitiveness of the agricultural sector 
through financial support provided for the 
modernisation of agricultural enterprises. 
The main mechanism of the AFP programme 
was the subsidy to a commercial interest rate 
paid by eligible agricultural enterprises for a 
loan on investment activities (total investment 
volume was allowed to vary between 175 
000 EUR and 500 000 EUR) carried out 
mainly in the milk and beef, pork, and agro-
tourism sectors. The subsidy to a commercial 
interest rate (approximately 13% of eligible 
investment volume) was provided to eligible 
individual farms for the period of 10 to 20 
years on an average amount of 23 000-30 000 
EUR/farm. During the years 2000-2006 total 
subsidies provided under AFP programme 
reached approximately 29.7 Mill EUR. 
During the period of 2000-2006 1513 farms 
received support from the AFP programme 
(net investment volume of 250 Mill EUR). 
The biggest part of the programme budget 
(approximately 80%) was provided for farm 
inventory (buildings) investment support, 
mainly in the milk and beef sectors. The rest 
was split up for investment support (including 
purchases of machinery or investments in 
alternative sources of energy) among the 
pork sector, the agro-tourism sector and the 
horticulture sector. Specific eligibility criteria, 
such as investment volume higher than 175 
000 EUR, eligible personal income up to 
90 000 EUR per person or 120 000 EUR per 
couple, excluded the smallest and the biggest 
agricultural farms from this programme.
11.2. Data
The main data source used for the 
assessment of the effects of the AFP programme 
in Schleswig-Holstein was farm bookkeeping 
data comprised of approximately 10 500 farms 
for the year 2000/2001 and 3 900 farms for 
the year 2007/2008). Furthermore, for specific 
comparisons approximately 400 datasets from 
“Testbetriebe” (part of FADN data set) were used.
Since the main focus of the AFP programme’s 
support was the milk and beef sector 1333 
bookkeeping farms specializing in milk/beef 
production were selected from the available data 
set and included in a panel for further analysis. 
The balanced panel (years 2001-2007) consisted 
of 101 milk/beef farms supported by the AFP 
programme and 1232 non-supported farms.
11.3. Major methodological 
assumptions of PSM-DID and the 
steps to be carried out
The main objective of our analysis was to 
estimate the micro-economic results of the AFP 
programme implemented during the years 2000-
2006 on milk/beef farms located in Schleswig-
Holstein, and especially to estimate selected 
direct and indirect effects of the programme 
(e.g. deadweight loss, substitution and leverage 
effects). As the main methodological approach a 
combination of PSM-DID methods was chosen. 
While the PSM-DID method is particularly useful 
for estimation of effects of a given RD programme 
at farm level, the applicability of a standard PSM 
method (based on estimation of the logit function) 
necessitates an assumption regarding the absence 
of general equilibrium effects. In other words, 
standard PSM estimates are only valid under an 
assumption of no indirect effects of a given RD 
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programme on programme non-beneficiaries. In 
practice, an absence of indirect effects on non-
beneficiaries has to be verified first in order to 
validate obtained results. 
Given the above, the empirical assessment 
of the effect of the AFP programme at a micro-
level involved the following stages:
Stage 1: Preliminary estimation of direct 
programme effects occurring at the level of 
direct programme beneficiaries (direct effect of 
the programme on Gross Value Added, profits or 
employment at a micro-level)
Stage 2: Preliminary estimation of specific 
indirect effects (e.g. deadweight loss and 
leverage effects) at the level of direct programme 
beneficiaries
Stage 3: Estimation of general equilibrium 
effects (e.g. substitution effects and replacement 
effects) at the level of programme non-beneficiaries
Stage 4: Re-estimation of Stage 1 and Stage 
2 in case of a presence of general equilibrium 
effects (e.g. substitution effects) by dropping from 
further analysis all “programme affected non-
beneficiaries”
11.4. Implementation of Stages 1-4
11.4.1. Preliminary estimation of direct 
programme effects occurring at the 
level of direct programme beneficiaries 
(Stage 1)
Here the following steps were carried out:
1. Using information about general- and 
measure-specific conditions for programme 
participation, potential programme 
eligible farms/enterprises (Measure 1: 
“Modernisation and Restructuring of 
Agricultural Enterprises”) were identified and 
selected from the available data base (e.g. 
bookkeeping or FADN data)
2. The above group of farms was divided into 
beneficiaries vs. non-programme beneficiaries. 
A balanced panel for both sub-groups (direct 
programme beneficiaries vs. non-beneficiaries) 
was constructed for years 2000 (i.e. prior to the 
implementation of the programme) and 2007 
i.e. (after the programme)
3. On the basis of expert knowledge the 
most important variables determining both 
economic outcomes, as well as the decision 
of farms specialized in milk/beef production 
to participate in the AFP programme, 
were selected from the list of variables/
coefficients available in bookkeeping (or 
FADN) data set. Selected variables were 
included in the list of covariates in the 
estimated logit function.
4. Given information on GVA per 
enterprise, profits and other important 
farm characteristics (e.g. land area, 
employment, value of assets, etc) prior 
to the programme (T=0) a PSM matching 
method was applied in order to construct 
appropriate controls.
5. The selection of a relevant matching technique 
was carried out using three independent 
criteria: i) standardized bias (Rosenbaum 
and Rubin, 1985); ii) t–test (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1985); and iii) joint significance and 
pseudo R² (Sianesi, 2004), see: methodology 
described in the section: 10.4.
6. The “similarity” of both groups prior to 
their participation in the programme was 
verified statistically (e.g. by performing 
balancing property tests involving selected 
covariates)
7. Specific policy indicators, e.g. Average 
Treatment Effects on Treated (ATT) were 
estimated before the programme (T=0) 
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and after the programme (T=1), using GVA 
per enterprise, profit per employee, etc. as 
relevant result indicators
8. Conditional DID method (combination 
of ATT and standard DID) was applied 
to calculate the net effects of the RD 
programme (at micro-level)
9. Sensitivity analysis of obtained results was 
performed using Rosenbaum bounds.
11.4.1.1. Results of Stage 1 (preliminary results):
The preliminary results of the application 
of the PSM method (DID-ATT) to the evaluation 
of the RD Agrarinvestitionförderungs programm 
(AFP) in Schleswig-Holstein (Germany) (Measure: 
Investments in milk and beef sectors) on the basis 
of 1,333 bookkeeping farms (101 AFP participants 
and 1,232 non-participants) specialized in milk 
production (panel for years 2001-2007) using profits 
as outcome indicator are presented in Table 11. 
Table 11. Estimated effect of AFP programme on milk farms (Schleswig-Holstein, Germany) – preliminary 
results using PSM-DID methodology
Calculation basis
Profit per farm in EUR
2001 Prior to participation
2007 After 
implementation
D I D (2007-2001)
Unmatched AFP participants
P=1 (101)
54,629 116,777 62,148
Unmatched Non-participants
P=0 (1,232)
43,007 83,718 40,711
Ø (1,333) 43,888 86,222 42,334
Difference (1-0) 11,621 33,059 21,438
Difference (1- Ø) 10,741 30,555 19,814
Matched AFP participants
M= 1 (101)
54,629 116,777 62,148
Matched Non-participants
M= 0 (1,067)
55,266 106,752 51,486
ATT -637 10,024 10,661
The application of the PSM (ATT-DID) 
method (given constraints on the common 
support region) resulted in the dropping of 165 
(non-comparable) non-beneficiaries from further 
analysis. Preliminary results obtained on the 
basis of PSM-DID methodology showed positive 
effects of the AFP programme on farm profit 
(+10,661 EUR). While these effects were found to 
be much smaller compared with effects obtained 
using traditional methods39 they are valid only 
39 Calculated programme effects using a comparison of 
programme beneficiaries with all (unmatched) non-
beneficiaries would be +21 438 EUR, or +19 814 EUR 
if programme beneficiaries were compared to a country’s 
average (see: Table 11). 
in the absence of significant general equilibrium 
effects (e.g. substitution effects). The respective 
verification was carried out at Stage 3.
11.4.2. Estimation of specific indirect effects 
(e.g. deadweight loss and leverage 
effects) at the level of direct programme 
beneficiaries (Stage 2)
11.4.2.1. Estimation of a deadweight loss 
(preliminary results)
A deadweight loss effect occurs if a participant 
of a RD programme would also have undertaken 
a similar investment without the RD programme 
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support (i.e. RD support would not change 
investment behaviour of a targeted enterprise). 
Deadweight loss effects can be measured 
by comparing performance of programme 
beneficiaries with respective controls and applying 
a relevant result indicator (e.g. investment value per 
farm/enterprise and year; or value of inventories per 
farm/enterprise and year) for calculations of the ATT 
prior to and after the programme. 
Estimation of deadweight loss at the level of 
direct programme beneficiaries was carried out 
in the following steps:
•	 Identification	 of	 units/farms	 supported	 from	
the AFP programme carrying out investments 
under a specific RD measure (e.g. Measure 
1: Modernisation and Restructuring of 
Agricultural Enterprises);
•	 Identification	in	the	control	group	(i.e.	similar	
programme non-participants) of a sub-vector 
of those farms which undertook similar 
investments as programme beneficiaries (in 
period between T=0 and T=1);
•	 Calculation	 of	 ATT	 using	 data	 from	 both	
groups and applying a selected result 
indicator (e.g. investment value per farms) 
before and after the programme;
•	 Applying	DID	on	the	estimated	ATT;
While it is expected that in case of a 
deadweight loss the calculated DID-ATT 
between the above groups will be close to zero, 
the estimated percentage of deadweight loss 
(between 0% and 100%) should be used to 
correct the estimates of direct programme effects.
The above methodology was applied to the 
estimation of the deadweight loss effects of the 
AFP programme (Measure: Investments in milk 
and beef sectors) using data on 376 selected 
bookkeeping farms (83 AFP participants and 293 
non-participants) specialized in milk production 
(panel for years 2001-2007) that undertook 
similar investments in the examined period. Our 
results show that, even without any support from 
the AFP programme, the value of inventories in 
the matched (control) group of non-beneficiaries 
(263 farms) increased in the examined period 
by 86% compared with the base period (prior 
to the programme) see: Table 12. While at the 
same time the value of inventories in the group 
of programme beneficiaries (83 farms) increased 
by 92% the estimated deadweight loss effects 
were as high as 93% (ratio of 86/92). This means 
that a huge portion of supported investment (i.e. 
93%) would have taken place even without the 
AFP programme, probably due to very favourable 
changes in economic conditions for dairy farmers 
(i.e. significant increase of price for milk). 
11.4.2.2. Estimation of leverage effects 
(preliminary results)
The leverage effect can be considered an 
important micro-economic consequence of RD 
support. It occurs if public funding (e.g. in form 
of a RD programme) induces private spending 
among the programme beneficiaries. 
Table 12. Estimated deadweight loss effect of AFP programme on milk farms (Schleswig-Holstein, 
Germany) 
Calculation basis
Value of inventories in EUR
2001 2007 DID (2001-2007)
Participants (P=1) (83) 80,058 153,545 73,487
Non-participants (P=0) (293) 57,379 108,539 51,160
Matched participants (M=1) (83) 80,058 153,545 73,487 (+92%)
Matched non-participants (M=0) (263) 70,181 130,733 60,552 (+86%)
Deadweight loss (M) 93% = (86/92)
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Calculation of the leverage effect was carried 
out by taking the following steps:
•	 selection of individual units j supported by a 
RD programme;
•	 identification of a comparison/control group 
matching with units j (identical distribution of 
covariates) in the period T=0 (i.e. prior to j’s 
access to the programme) using PSM method;
•	 selection of relevant result indicators as 
proxies for private spending, e.g. money 
transfers from farm to farm households; level 
of private and farm consumption, etc.; 
•	 calculation of ATT for selected result 
indicators between both groups (i.e. j and 
m);
•	 Applying DID on the estimated ATT;
It is expected that in case of a significant 
leverage effects the calculated DID-ATT will be 
positive and significant. 
The application of the above methodology 
for the estimation of the leverage effects in the 
AFP programme in Schleswig-Holstein (Germany) 
(Measure: Investments in milk and beef sectors) 
on the basis of 1,333 bookkeeping farms (101 
AFP participants and 1,232 non-participants) 
Table 13a. Estimation of the leverage effects in AFP programme (Schleswig-Holstein). Result indicator: 
Money transfer from farm to farm household for living
Calculation basis
Variable: Money transfer from farm to farm households for living
2001 2007 D I D (2007-2001)
Unmatched P=1 (101) 30,072 43,810 13,738
Unmatched P=0 (1,232) 24,512 32,336 7,824
Ø (1,333) 24,933 33,206 8,273
Difference (1-0) 5,560 11,473 5,913
Difference (1- Ø) 5,139 10,604 5,465
Matched M= 1 (101) 30,072 43,810 13,738
Matched M= 0 (1,067) 27,647 36,732 9,085
ATT 2,424 7,077 4,653
Table 13b. Estimation of the leverage effects in AFP programme (Schleswig-Holstein). Result indicator: 
Money transfer from farm for building of private assets 
Calculation basis
Money transfers from farm for building of private assets
2001 2007 D I D (2007-2001)
Unmatched P=1 (101) 18,447 48,302 29,855
Unmatched P=0 (1,232) 11,632 31,926 20,294
Ø (1,333) 12,148 33,167 21,019
Difference (1-0) 6,814 16,376 9,562
Difference (1- Ø) 6,299 15,135 8,836
Matched M= 1 (101) 18,447 48,302 29,855
Matched M= 0 (1,067) 17,504 44,181 26,677
ATT 942 4,120 3,178
ATNT 1,865 1,781 -84
ATE 1,785 1,983 198
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specialized in milk production (panel for years 
2001-2007) indicates considerable leverage 
effects. Indeed, investment support through the AFP 
programme brought about significant additional 
transfers of funds from farms to households (e.g. 
additional money transfers from farm to farm 
households for living on average EUR +4,653 per 
farm, see: Tab 13a; additional money transfers 
from farm to households for building of private 
assets on average EUR +3,178 per farm, see Tab 
13b; additional total money transfers from farms 
to farm households on average EUR +14,550 per 
farm, see Tab 13c). The above figures show that the 
propensity to consume among farms that received 
support from the AFP programme was much higher 
compared with similar coefficient calculated for 
programme non-beneficiaries (i.e. the programme 
leverage effect was substantial). 
While a high proportion of additional 
transfers from farms to farm households among 
programme beneficiaries could originate from 
higher farm profits, it appears that investment 
support induced farms’ private spending much 
more strongly than the building of deposits 
(“Einlagen”). Indeed, total transfers from farms 
to farm households increased in the examined 
period on average by EUR 14,550 while in the 
same period total money transfers to farms (farm 
deposits) grew by only EUR 1,607 (see Table 14). 
Table 13c. Estimation of the leverage effects in AFP programme (Schleswig-Holstein). Result indicator: 
Total money transfer from farm to farm household 
Calculation basis Total money transfers from farm to farm household
2001 2007 D I D (2007-2001)
Unmatched P=1 (101) 75,415 137,886 62,471
Unmatched P=0 (1,232) 61,393 99,493 38,100
Ø (1,333) 62,455 102,402 39,947
Difference (1-0) 14,022 38,392 24,370
Difference (1- Ø) 12,960 35,484 22,524
Matched M= 1 (101) 75,415 137,886 62,471
Matched M= 0 (1,067) 76,181 124,100 47,919
ATT -765 13,785 14,550
ATNT -3,016 8,460 11,476
ATE -2,821 8,920 11,741
Table 14. Effects in AFP programme (Schleswig-Holstein). Result indicator: Total money transfers to farm 
(“Einlagen insgesamt”) 
Calculation basis
Total money transfers to farm 
2001 2007 D I D (2007-2001)
Unmatched P=1 (101) 25,604 46,426 21,362
Unmatched P=0 (1,232) 22,812 36,069 13,257
Ø (1,333) 23,024 36,853 13,829
Difference (1-0) 2,791 10,357 7,566
Difference (1- Ø) 2,580 9,573 6,993
Matched M= 1 (101) 25,604 46,426 21,362
Matched M= 0 (1,067) 26,823 46,036 17,413
ATT -1,218 389 1,607
ATNT -1,352 821 2,173
ATE -1,341 783 2,124
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11.4.3. Estimation of specific indirect 
programme effects on non supported 
farms/enterprises (Stage 3)
General equilibrium (GE) effects occur when 
a given programme affects (positively or negatively) 
farms/enterprises other than direct programme 
participants. Important GE effects are substitution 
effect and displacement effect. The major 
methodological problems linked to the estimation 
of GE effects are discussed in Chapter 6.2.1.
11.4.3.1. Estimation of programme substitution 
effects
The substitution effect belongs to the indirect 
general equilibrium or macro-economic effects 
of a given programme. It is normally defined as 
the effect occurring in favour of direct programme 
beneficiaries but at the expense of persons/farms/
units that do not participate in a given intervention. 
For example, due to a given RD programme input/
factor prices in an affected region may increase; or 
regional produce prices may decrease compared 
with other regions (e.g. where the programme was 
not implemented or implementation intensity was 
low) which may finally affect profits/employment/
gross value added etc. of farms which were not 
direct programme beneficiaries. The substitution 
effect (in contrast to the displacement effect) 
occurs primarily in a direct neighbourhood of 
units supported by a given programme. It can be 
expected that this effect will have an impact on all 
major programme result indicators, e.g. GVA per 
enterprise.
Learning about substitution effects of RD 
programmes is important for particular reasons:
•	 It facilitates the assessment of the net 
effectiveness of a given RD programme;
•	 In case of using PSM methodology, it 
provides additional information on the 
validity of preliminary results calculated at 
the level of direct programme beneficiaries 
(see: Chapter 11.2).
Generally, substitution effects can be 
measured using similar techniques as in the case 
with direct programme effects (i.e. by applying 
PSM-DID methodology). Yet, the basic difference 
in comparison with standard PSM is the necessity 
to redefine the “treatment” by using one of two 
alternative approaches defined in Chapter 6.2.1.
 
In case of the AFP programme (Schleswig-
Holstein) Approach 2 (see: 6.2.1.) was chosen as 
it allows the estimation of the indirect impact of 
the programme on other (similar) farms located in 
a close neighbourhood of programme beneficiary 
farms. As the intensity of the AFP programme was 
the highest in two neighbouring sub-regions of 
Schleswig-Holstein (i.e. Nordfriesland (NF) and 
Schleswig-Flensburg (S-F)) it was assumed that 
in these two regions the probability of positive/
negative indirect impact of the programme 
on programme non-beneficiaries was also the 
highest. The basic idea behind this approach 
was therefore to compare performance (e.g. 
profits, GVA, employment, etc.) of programme 
non-beneficiaries in regions where intensity 
of a given programme exposure was high (high 
probability of positive/negative effects from a 
given programme; P=1) with the performance 
of similar programme non-beneficiaries in other 
regions characterised by a low programme 
intensity (P=0). A high difference in the estimated 
ATT-DID between both groups should indicate 
the existence of substitution effects. No difference 
in calculated ATT-DID for non-participants in 
both regions would indicate the absence of 
substitution effects.
The approach was implemented in the 
following steps:
•	 Disregarding all programme participants;
•	 Performing PSM analysis by computing ATT 
for “seemingly affected” (non-participants) in 
the high intensity regions NF and S-F (P=1) 
versus non-affected (non-participants) in 
other regions (P=0), whereby the economic 
performance of non-participants in NF and 
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S-F regions can be described as a result of 
a “non-intended selection to programme” 
implemented at a given area;
•	 Carrying out all other steps as in standard 
PSM analysis (e.g. selection of matching 
method, testing similarity between matched 
and controls, sensitivity analysis, etc.);
•	 Calculation of ATTs and DID-ATT, whereby 
(i.e. depending on obtained results);
-	 if the estimated DID-ATT is low or zero, this 
implies no significant general equilibrium 
effects (e.g. substitution effects). It also 
means that preliminary results of a standard 
PSM method are valid, or
-	 if the estimated DID-ATT is high, this 
suggests a presence of significant 
general equilibrium effects (substitution 
effects) in regions where the programme 
intensity was the highest (NF and S-F). 
This means also that preliminary results 
of PSM applied under the Stage 1 are 
biased (especially for the year 2007!). 
Should this happen “affected non-
participants” in respective regions (NF 
and S-F) would have to be dropped from 
further analysis and the DID-ATT should 
be re-estimated again.
The above methodology was applied to the 
estimation of the substitution effects in the AFP 
programme in Schleswig-Holstein (Germany) 
(Measure: Investments in milk and beef sectors). 
An analysis of substitution effects was carried out 
on the basis of bookkeeping data collected for 
1,231 programme non-beneficiaries specialized 
in milk production (balanced panel for years 
2001-2007), of which: 526 were located in 
regions with the highest exposure to the AFP 
programme (NF and S-F; ) and 705 were located 
in other (“non-affected”) regions. 
Our results show that profits per farm among 
programme non-beneficiaries located in regions 
with zero or low intensity of AFP programme 
increased much stronger (EUR +41,371) in the 
years 2001-2007 compared with profits per 
farm in the group of farms (non-beneficiaries) 
located in the regions where the intensity of the 
AFP programme was the highest (EUR +37,824, 
see: Table 15). The estimated substitution 
effects lead therefore to a deterioration in the 
economic situation of farms which did not 
receive programme support (programme non-
beneficiaries), i.e. through a reduction of profit by 
EUR -3,546 per farm on average. 
Similar negative substitution effects of 
the AFP programme affecting non-programme 
participants located in regions with the highest 
Table 15. Estimated substitution  effects of AFP programme on milk farms (Schleswig-Holstein, 
Germany)
Calculation basis Profit per farm
2001 2007 D I D (2007-2001)
Unmatched P=1 (526) 46,349 84,703 38,354
Unmatched P=0 (705) 40,531 83,034 42,503
Ø (1,231) 43,017 83,747 37,398
Difference (1-0) 5,817 1,669 -4,148
Difference (1- Ø) 3,332 956 -2,376
Matched M =1 (517) 45,933 83,757 37,824
Matched M= 0 (677) 48,559 89,930 41,371
ATT -2,626 -6,172 -3,546
 ATNT 4,337 -2,414 -6,751
ATE 1,322 -4,041 -5,363
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programme intensity were found in the cases 
of the following result indicators: economic 
corrected profit, milk production, corrected 
profit per person fully employed (AK), corrected 
profit per family labour, standard profit per fully 
employed, and standard profit per family labour. 
The negative substitution effects could have 
occurred due to many factors. One possible 
explanation is that agricultural farms that were 
directly supported by the AFP programme 
considerably increased their demand for specific 
inputs, e.g. land (pastures or arable land) thus 
leading to an increase of input (e.g. land) prices. 
Indeed, while the leasing price for agricultural land 
remained at the same level in the regions where 
support from the AFP programme was very intensive 
it dropped by 7.3% in those regions where the 
programme was not implemented or the intensity of 
AFP implementation was low (see: Table 16)40. 
11.4.4. Re-estimation of Stage 1 (due to a 
presence of significant substitution 
effects) (Stage 4)
Considerable programme substitution effects 
imply the presence of a bias in the estimation 
of programme effects on direct programme 
beneficiaries (a control group is affected by a given 
programme). In order to eliminate this bias all 
programme non-beneficiaries located in regions with 
the highest programme intensity, i.e. regions NF and 
S-F (i.e. all programme affected non-beneficiaries) 
were dropped from further analysis and the results of 
Stage 1 were re-estimated without these farms. 
40 Obviously, the AFP programme support lead to an 
increase of economic capacities of these farms that could 
later afford to pay a higher leasing price for land. 
A new assessment of the effect of the AFP 
programme on programme beneficiaries (re-
estimation of results from Stage 1) was carried out 
on the basis of remaining 807 observations on 
bookkeeping farms in Schleswig Holstein (2001-
2007) specialized in milk production (all farms 
that were not supported by the AFP programme 
but which were located in regions: NF and S-F 
were dropped from further analysis). The major 
steps of the further analysis were consistent with 
those in Stage 1, and included:
•	 Re-estimation of a logit function using the 
same covariates as in Stage 1 yet, based 
on a different number of observations (807 
instead of 1333)
•	 Calculation of individual propensity score 
for programme beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries
•	 Imposing restrictions on the common 
support region (as both ATT, ATNT and ATE 
indicators were to be computed, comparable 
units had to be found in both groups)
•	 Selection of a relevant matching technique. 
This was carried out using three independent 
criteria: i) standardized bias (Rosenbaum 
and Rubin, 1985); ii) t–test (Rosenbaum 
and Rubin, 1985); and iii) joint significance 
and pseudo R² (Sianesi, 2004) and applying 
methodology described in Section 10.4.
•	 Statistical verification of the “similarity” of 
both groups prior to their participation in the 
programme (e.g. by performing balancing 
property tests on the most important farm 
characteristics)
Table 16. Difference in the leasing price for agricultural land (in EUR per ha) paid by non-beneficiaries of 
the AFP programme in Schleswig-Holstein (2001-2007)
Regions NF and S-F (high intensity of AFP) 
(non beneficiaries, N = 517) 
Other regions (low intensity of AFP)
(non beneficiaries, N = 677) 
2001 2007 2001 2007 
12001 11998 12461 11543 
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•	 Calculation of specific policy indicators, 
e.g. Average Treatment Effects on Treated 
(ATT) estimated before the programme (T=0) 
and after the programme (T=1), using GVA 
per enterprise, profit per employed, etc. as 
relevant result indicators
•	 Application of conditional DID method 
(combination of ATT and standard DID) for 
calculation of the first component, i.e. the net 
effect of the RD programme on GVA generated 
by programme beneficiaries (at micro-level)
•	 Performing sensitivity analysis of obtained 
results using Rosenbaum bounds.
11.4.4.1. Re-estimation of a logit function
After cleaning the data base (by dropping 
from the set of potential controls those 
agricultural farms which were affected by 
the AFP programme) the logit function was 
re-estimated using 807 observations on 
bookkeeping farms (Schleswig-Holstein) 
specialized in milk production, of which 
101 were programme beneficiaries and 706 
programme non-beneficiaries. The list of 
variables (38) that determine both programme 
participation and outcomes and were included 
as relevant covariates is provided in Table 17 
(below). Among the variables used to match 
programme beneficiaries with programme 
non-beneficiaries an important one was 
the covariate showing the former level of 
support obtained from the RD programme 
previously implemented in Schleswig-Holstein 
(vsupp). Inclusion of this variable allowed us 
to increase comparability and to overcome 
a problem mentioned in many evaluation 
studies concerning non-existence of non-
supported farms (from current and previous RD 
programmes) in a specific programme area.
Table 17. Schleswig-Holstein: List of variables selected as covariates to estimation of logit function 
(excluding programme non-beneficiaries in regions with the highest programme exposure)
List of variables
v1025i2 Value of fixed assets – buildings
v1030i2 Operating facilities (value) 
v1031i2 Machinery (value) 
v1091i2 Cattle (value) 
v1110i2 Inventory stock 
v1449i2 Capital stock (value) 
v2129i5 Revenues beef/cattle/milk sales 
v2705i5 Purchased concentrated feed for cattle
v2799i5 Labour costs (total)
v4116i2    Milk yield (per cow)    
v5111i2      Fem. Calves > 0.5 year 
v5112i2      Fem. Calves > 0.5 and < 1 year 
v5113i2      Fem. Cattle > 1 and < 2 years 
v5114i2      Breeding Heifer 
v5115i2       Heifer 
v5116i2     Milk cows  
v5117i2     Suckler cows   
v5118i2     Slaughter cows
v5120i2      Male calves > 0.5   
v5121i2     Male cattle > 0.5 and < 1 year   
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The results of logit estimation are shown in 
Table 18.
v5122i2      Male cattle > 1 and < 1.5 years 
v5123i2     Male cattle > 1.5 and < 2 years 
v5124i2     Male cattle > 2 years 
v5125i2     Breeding bulls 
v6104i7     Pasture area 
v6119i7  Agricultural area (total) 
v7098i3      Non-family labour 
v7099i3     Labour total 
vmilkprod    Milk production 
v8026i2     Excess milk quota 
v9001     Equity capital formation 
v9003 v9003 
v9005    Labour productivity (cattle/beef/milk per total labour)   
v9006     Labour productivity (milk per total labour)   
profit01 profit01
v9004      Adjusted equity capital formation
profit_co~01    Profit per farm (adjusted)    
v8213i2 Earnings from non-self-employment   
v2381i5     Interest subsidy to investment   
vsupp Obtained level of support from previous programmes
Table 18. Schleswig-Holstein. Results of estimation of a logit function
Logistic regression
Log likelihood = 243.64496
Number of obs = 807
LR chi2 (40) = 121.30
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.1993
Particip Coef. Std. Err. z P>  Z [95% Conf. Interval]
v1025i2_01 2.02e-06 2.35e-06 0.86 0.390 -2.59e-06 6.63e-06
v1030i2_01 -4.51e-06 7.51e-06 -0.60 0.548 -.0000192 .0000102
v1031i2_01 -.0000268 7.17e-06 -3.74 0.000 -.0000408 -.0000127
v1091i2_01 1.97e-06 .0000146 0.13 0.893 -.0000267 .0000306
v1110i2_01 .0000383 .0000487 0.79 0.432 -.0000572 .0001338
v1449i2_01 -2.54e-07 3.65e-07 -0.69 0.488 -9.70e-07 4.63e-07
v2129i5_01 6.66e-06 9.42e-06 0.71 0.480 -.0000118 .0000251
v2705i5_01 .0000454 .0000106 4.28 0.000 .0000246 .0000662
v2799i5_01 .0001077 .0004719 0.23 0.819 -.0008171 .0010326
v4116i2_01 -.0000613 .0002764 -0.22 0.825 -.000603 .0004805
v5111i2_01 .0186913 .0178942 1.04 0.296 -.0163807 .0537632
v5112i2_01 .0118835 .0167657 0.71 0.478 -.0209766 .0447436
v5113i2_01 -.0121226 .0153492 -0.79 0.430 -0422064 .0179613
v5114i2_01 -.0060769 .0137317 -0.44 0.658 -.0329905 .0208366
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In the next step the results of a logit function 
estimation were used to derive for all agricultural 
farms specialized in milk production their 
individual probability (propensity scores) of 
participation in the AFP programme (Measure 1: 
Modernization of agricultural farms).
11.4.4.2. Selection of a matching algorithm
As the quality of a given matching algorithm 
depends strongly on a data set, the selection of 
a relevant matching technique was carried out 
using three independent criteria: i) standardized 
bias (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985); ii) t–test 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985); and iii) joint 
significance and pseudo R² (Sianesi, 2004).
Similarly to the cases of other assessments of 
programme impact we found that the best results 
were achieved by using an iterative procedure (e.g. 
linear search) aimed to minimise the calculated 
standardized bias41 (after matching) and applying 
min{min} as the main selection criterion. In all 
41 The standardized bias is the difference of the sample 
means in the treated and non-treated (full or matched) 
sub-samples as a percentage of the square root of the 
average of the sample variances in the treated and non-
treated groups (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). 
v5115i2_01 -.0134439 .0618279 -0.22 0.828 -.1346243 .1077365
v5116i2_01 -.0613138 .0338315 -1.81 0.070 -.1276224 .0049947
v5117i2_01 -.016113 .0720671 -0.22 0.823 -.1573618 .1251358
v5118i2_01 -.0048062 .0287148 -0.17 0.867 -.610862 .0514739
v5120i2_01 .0121035 .0156262 0.77 0.439 -.0185234 .0427303
v5121i2_01 .0165394 .0131412 1.26 0.208 -.0092169 .0422956
v5122i2_01 .014429 .013428 1.07 0.283 -.0118895 .0407475
v5123i2_01 .0051632 .0197474 0.26 0.794 -.0335411 .0438675
v5124i2_01 -.285279 .3196748 -0.89 0.372 -.9118302 .3412722
v5125i2_01 .1216614 .1539543 0.79 0.429 -.1800836 .4234063
v6104i7_01 .0072186 .0068231 1.06 0.290 -.0061544 .0205916
v6119i7_01 .0050058 .0079983 0.63 0.531 -.0106706 .0206822
v7098i3_01 -.581429 .4297761 -1.35 0.176 -1.423775 .2609166
v7099i3_01 .3884432 .3904466 0.99 0.320 -.376818 1.153704
vmilkprod_01 7.79e-06 5.58e-06 1.40 0.163 -3.15e-06 .0000187
v8026i2_01 1.93e-06 3.32e-06 0.58 0.562 -4.59e-06 8.44e-06
v9001_01 8.19e-07 1.47e-06 0.56 0.577 -2.06e-06 3.70e-06
v9003_01 -.0001288 .0004732 -0.27 0.786 -.0010563 .0007987
v9005_01 -3.84e-06 .0000143 -0.27 0.787 -.0000318 .0000241
v9006_01 .0005672 .0006534 0.87 0.385 -.0007134 .0018478
profit01 -4.90e-06 8.59e-06 -0.57 0.568 -.0000217 .0000119
v9004_01 2.55e-07 2.98e-06 0.09 0.932 -5.58e-06 6.09e-06
profit_co~01 1.37e-06 5.39e-06 0.25 0.800 -9.20e-06 .0000119
v8212i2_01 -.0005951 .0013484 -0.44 0.659 -.0032378 .0020476
v8213i2_01 .0000249 .000037 0.67 0.500 -.0000476 .0000975
vsupp_01 -1.32e-06 .0000126 -0.10 0.917 -.0000261 .0000234
_cons -3.443257 2.004407 -1.72 0.086 -7.371823 .4853098
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considered cases (various matching algorithms)42 
an optimal solution could easily be found due to 
local/global convexity of the objective function 
with respect to function parameters under each 
matching algorithm (e.g. radius magnitude in radius 
matching; or number of nearest neighbours in 
nearest neighbour matching). An overview of results 
obtained using different matching algorithms for the 
case of re-estimation of effects of the AFP programme 
in Schleswig-Holstein is provided in Table 19.
The lowest estimated standardized bias 
(after matching) was found in the case of caliper 
matching (0.07). This matching algorithm was 
therefore used in the further work for assessment 
42 This does not apply to local linear weighting function 
matching which first smoothes the outcome and then 
performs nearest neighbour matching. In this case more 
controls are used to calculate the counterfactual outcome 
than the nearest neighbor only (Leuven and Sianesi, 2007).
of the effect of the AFP programme on direct 
programme beneficiaries43.
The application of the above procedure and 
the imposition of common support restrictions 
resulted in the dropping of 46 farms (2 programme 
supported and 44 non-programme supported) from 
further analysis, thus selecting 761 comparable farms 
of which: 99 were programme participants and 662 
were programme non-participants (Table 20).
11.4.4.3. Verification of the balancing property 
of matched variables 
One of the important criteria applied for the 
assessment of the matching’s quality can be the 
43 The caliper matching algorithm (0.07) was also found to 
perform satisfactory concerning other important Selection 
criteria, i.e. balancing property and pseudo R² tests (see below). 
Table 20. Schleswig-Holstein: Overview of the matched sample of agricultural farms
Treatment
Common support
Total
Off support On support
Untreated
Treated
44
2
662
99
706
101
Total 46 761 807
Table 19. Selection of a relevant matching algorithm
Matching method Matching parameters
Estimated standardized bias
(after matching)
Nearest neighbours N (8) 4.30
N (9) 3.90
N (10) 4.02
Caliper (0.08) 3.76
(0.07) Selected (min) => 3.70
(0.06) 3.95
Kernel normal bw (0.03) 4.22
bw (0.04) 3.99
bw (0.05) 4.13
Kernel biweight 4.65
Kernel epanechnikov bw (0.10) 3.92
bw (0.09) 3.76
bw (0.08) 3.89
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...Table 21. Schleswig-Holstein. Balancing property tests
Variable-Name variable Sample Treated Control %bias |bias|
Long-term assets – buildings v1025i2_01
Unmatched 78645 64423 26.4
Matched 77665 77949 -0.5 98.0
Operating facilities (value) v1030i2_01
Unmatched 17355 16524 4.4
Matched 17400 17474 -0.4 91.1
Machinery (value) v1031i2_01
Unmatched 28285 32066 -16.3
Matched 28410 28297 0.5 97.0
Cattle (value) v1091i2_01
Unmatched 1.1e+05 93309 43.7
Matched 1.1e+05 1.1e+05 4.8 89.0
Inventory stock v1110i2_01
Unmatched 174.12 93.661 4.3
Matched 177.64 115.81 3.3 23.2
Capital stock (value) v1449i2_01
Unmatched 6.8e+05 6.6e+05 5.9
Matched 6.8e+05 6.7e+05 2.8 52.3
Revenues beef/cattle/milk sales v2129i5_01
Unmatched 2.3e+05 1.7e+05 63.7
Matched 2.2e+05 2.2e+05 6.3 90.1
Purchased concentrated feed for cattle v2705i5_01
Unmatched -29362 -26278 -16.0
Matched -29955 -30484 2.7 82.9
Labour costs (total) v2799i5_01
Unmatched -6808.1 -5562.6 -14.9
Matched -6815.2 -6229.6 -7.0 53.0
Milk yield (per cow)    v4116i2_01  
Unmatched 7351.9 6572 64.0
Matched 7340.2 7283.7 4.6 92.8
Fem. Calves > 0.5 year v5111i2_01   
Unmatched 17.089 13.544 35.7
Matched 16.929 16.114 8.2 77.0
Fem. Calves > 0.5 and < 1 year v5112i2_01   
Unmatched 21.911 19.007 25.4
Matched 21.788 21.116 5.9 76.9
Fem. Cattle > 1 and < 2 years v5113i2_01   
Unmatched 35.119 30.305 32.9
Matched 35.03 33.67 9.3 71.7
Breeding Heifer v5114i2_01   
Unmatched 19.218 19.221 -0.0
Matched 19.222 19.545 -2.6 -10189.4
Heifer v5115i2_01    
Unmatched .18812 .30028 -6.4
Matched .19192 .15312 2.2 65.4
Milk cows  v5116i2_01   
Unmatched 71.861 61.584 38.6
Matched 71.404 70.437 3.6 90.6
Suckler cows   v5117i2_01   
Unmatched .13861 .25212 -6.8
Matched .14141 .12746 0.8 87.7
Slaughter cows v5118i2 _01  
Unmatched 2.4158 1.5312 20.9
Matched 2.4646 2.2616 4.8 77.0
Male calves > 0.5   v5120i2 _01   
Unmatched 14.762 10.374 41.7
Matched 14.525 14.631 -1.0 97.6
Male cattle > 0.5 and < 1 year   v5121i2 _01  
Unmatched 19.465 13.006 44.7
Matched 19.364 20.036 -4.7 89.6
Male cattle > 1 and < 1.5 years v5122i2_01   
Unmatched 16.04 9.7578 43.3
Matched 15.818 15.918 -0.7 98.4
Male cattle > 1.5 and < 2 years v5123i2_01   
Unmatched 4.6337 2.6785 26.3
Matched 4.5556 4.4296 1.7 93.6
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comparison of mean values of relevant covariates 
in both groups of farms (programme beneficiaries 
vs. controls) before and after matching (using the 
selected matching algorithm). It is expected that 
application of the selected matching algorithm 
(here: caliper matching 0.07) will lead to a 
considerable reduction in original differences in 
mean values of each individual variable included 
as a covariate in the logit function, between 
supported and non-supported groups of farms.
The comparison of mean values for all 
variables included as covariates in the estimated 
logit function in both groups of farms before 
and after matching is presented in Table 21. The 
results show that for almost all variables (except 
Male cattle > 2 years v5124i2 _01  
Unmatched .05941 .2762 -15.4
Matched .0404 .04363 -0.2 98.5
Breeding bulls v5125i2 _01  
Unmatched .63366 .61331 2.4
Matched .60606 .60544 0.1 96.9
Pasture area (ha) v6104i7 _01  
Unmatched 48.231 39.04 36.1
Matched 47.908 45.685 8.7 75.8
Agricultural area (total)  (ha) v6119i7 _01 
Unmatched 94.335 83.954 26.9
Matched 93.834 92.596 3.2 88.1
Non-family labour  (AK) v7098i3_01   
Unmatched .17337 .18493 -2.5
Matched .17586 .14761 6.2 -144.3
Labour total  (AK) v7099i3_01   
Unmatched 1.7463 1.7426 0.5
Matched 1.7523 1.7325 2.7 -429.2
Milk production vmilkprod_01
Unmatched 5.3e+05 4.1e+05 59.0
Matched 5.3e+05 5.1e+05 5.9 90.1
Excess milk quota v8026i2_01   
Unmatched 22801 15735 20.8
Matched 23064 20533 7.4 64.2
Equity capital formation v9001 _01   
Unmatched 1.6e+05 1.3e+05 23.5
Matched 1.6e+05 1.5e+05 5.4 77.1
v9003 v9003_01
Unmatched -5374.4 -4303 -13.2
Matched -5387.1 -4827.3 -6.9 47.8
Labour productivity (cattle/beef / milk 
per total labour)   
v9005_01 
Unmatched 1.4e+05 1.1e+05 69.6
Matched 1.4e+05 1.4e+05 0.5 99.2
Labour productivity (milk per total 
labour)   
v9006 _01   
Unmatched 3303 2487.6 64.8
Matched 3266.7 3255.9 0.9 98.7
profit01 profit01
Unmatched 54629 40518 48.8
Matched 54634 52293 8.1 83.4
Adjusted equity capital formation v9004 _01   
Unmatched 4818 2168.3 5.6
Matched 4847.6 6284 -3.0 45.8
Profit per farm (adjusted)    profit_co~01  
Unmatched 35728 23889 35.3
Matched 35855 34159 5.1 85.7
Earnings from self-employment   v8212i2
Unmatched 9.8107 93.767 -10.2
Matched 10.009 11.991 -0.2 97.6
Earnings from non-self-employment   v8213i2     
Unmatched 466.01 534.24 -2.3
Matched 475 389.37 2.9 -25.5
vsupp_01 vsupp 
Unmatched 9340 8685.3 5.8
Matched 9206.3 8954.3 2.2 61.5
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for the variables: number of breeding heifers, 
non-family labour and earnings from non-self 
employment) the selected matching procedure 
resulted in a significant reduction of differences in 
variables’ means among both groups of farms, i.e. 
beneficiaries vs. controls thus making both groups 
of farms much more comparable. Furthermore, 
after the implementation of the above matching 
procedure the estimated standardized selection 
bias could be reduced from 25.6 (before 
matching) to 3.70 (after matching), i.e. it dropped 
by 86%. At the same time pseudo R² decreased 
as expected, i.e. dropped from 0.201 to 0.119 
respectively, i.e. by 41%. 
11.4.4.4. Results indicators
The assessment of the effect of the AFP 
programme (Schleswig-Holstein) on:
•	 direct programme beneficiaries (by means of 
ATT indicator);
•	 programme non-beneficiaries (potential 
impact by means of ATNT indicator);
•	 randomly selected unit from the sample 
of programme beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries (potential impact by means of 
ATE indicator);
was carried out using the following result 
indicators:
•	 Profit per farm;
•	 Corrected profit per farm44;
44 Corrected profit per farm = profit - (v2460i5 + v2461i5 
+ v2462i5 + v2463i5 + v2489i5 + v2492i5 + v2493i5 
+ v2494i5 + v2495i5 + v2496i5 ) + v2870i5 + v2871i5 
+ v2872i5 + v2873i5 + v2887i5 + v2888i5 + v2889i5 
+ v2890i5 + v2891i5 + v2894i5 + v2895i5 (i.e. current 
profits corrected for revenues and expenses linked to 
other periods: “Gewinne – zeitraumfremde Erträge + 
zeitraumfremde Aufwendungen”)
•	 Addition to economic assets (capital 
formation)45; 
•	 Milk production (total per farm);
•	 Labour productivity (value of milk and beef 
production per fully employed persons (AK));
•	 Transfers from farm to household for living 
(for assessment of programme leverage 
effects);
•	 Transfers from farms to household for 
building of private assets (for assessment of 
programme leverage effects);
•	 Transfers from farm to household (total) (for 
assessment of programme leverage effects);
•	 Corrected profit (adjusted for taxes and other 
payments pre-paid)46;
•	 Farm total employment (family labour + 
hired labour) in fully employed units (AK);
•	 Corrected profit per family labour47;
•	 Corrected profit per fully employed person48 
(family labour + hired labour);
•	 Standard profit per family labour;
•	 Standard profit per fully employed person 
(family labour + hired labour);
•	 Extended profit per farm (profit + paid 
salaries/wages);
45 Net increase of economic assets = profit + sum of deposits 
to farms – sum of transfers from the farm + transfers for 
building of private assets – transfers from private assets
46 Corrected profit (adjusted for taxes and other payments 
pre-paid) = profit - (v2460i5 + v2461i5 + v2462i5 + 
v2463i5 + v2489i5 + v2492i5 + v2493i5 + v2494i5 + 
v2495i5 + v2496i5 ) + v2870i5 + v2871i5 + v2872i5 + 
v2873i5 + v2889i5 + v2890i5 + v2891i5 + 0.9*v2894i5 
+ v2895i5 
47 pro_corr_akf_ = profit_corr_ / (v7099i3_01 - v7098i3_01)
48 Corrected profit per fully employed person= profit_corr_ / 
v7099i3
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11.4.4.5. Effects of the AFP programme on 
direct programme beneficiaries (re-
estimation results)
The re-estimated effects of the AFP programme 
on the above result indicators and respective 
comparisons with results obtained from using 
traditional evaluation techniques (e.g. before-after; 
beneficiaries vs. all (unmatched) non-beneficiaries 
(1-0); beneficiaries vs. country’s averages comprising 
both beneficiaries and all non-beneficiaries (1- Ø), 
etc. are shown in Tables 22a-22c. 
11.4.4.5.1. Leverage effects (re-estimated)
Leverage effects were re-estimated by 
applying the procedures described above and 
dropping all non-beneficiary farms that were 
located in regions NF and S-F (the latter are 
considered to be affected by the AFP programme, 
i.e. by taking into account programme 
substitution effects) from the data set.
The new (re-estimated) results (Table 22a-22c) 
which are based on a considerable reduction of 
Table 22a. Re-estimated leverage effects in AFP programme (Schleswig-Holstein). Result indicator: Money 
transfer from farm to farm household for living
Calculation basis Total money transfers from farm to farm household for living
2001 2007 D I D (2007-2001)
Unmatched  P=1 ( 101 ) 30,072 43,810 13,738
Unmatched P=0 ( 706 ) 24,770 32,726 7,956
Average Ø ( 807) 25,433 34,113 8,680
Difference (1-0) 5,302 11,083 5,781
Difference (1- Ø) 4,639 9,697 5,058
Matched M=1 ( 99) 30,292 44,161 13,869
Matched M=0 ( 662) 28,299 37,508 9,209
ATT 1,993 6,652 4,659
ATNT -3,051 -2,682 369
ATE -2,395 -1,467 928
Table 22b. Re-estimated leverage effects in AFP programme (Schleswig-Holstein). Result indicator: Money 
transfer from farm to farm household for building of private assets
Calculation basis
Total money transfers from farm to farm household for building of private assets
2001 2007 D I D (2007-2001)
Unmatched  P=1 ( 101 ) 18,447 48,302 29855
Unmatched P=0 ( 706 ) 11,490 27,973 16,483
Average Ø ( 807) 12,361 30,517 18,156
Difference (1-0) 6,956 20,329 13,373
Difference (1- Ø) 6,086 17,785 11,699
Matched M=1 ( 99) 18,541 47,848 29,307
Matched M=0 ( 662) 15,170 34,952 19,782
ATT 3,370 12,896 9,526
 ATNT 2,827 4,736 1,909
ATE 2,897 5,797 2,900
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the selection bias (originating from the substitution 
effects) show the AFP programme to have slightly 
higher leverage effects in comparison with former 
outcomes. Indeed, the AFP programme was 
found to substantially induce private spending 
among programme beneficiaries, i.e. participation 
in the AFP programme led to: an increase in 
money transfers from farm to farm household 
for living compared to similar non-beneficiaries 
by approximately +4,659 EUR per farm (Table 
21a); an increase in money transfers from farm to 
farm household for building of private assets by 
approximately +9,526 EUR per farm (Table 21b); 
and an increase in total money transfers from farm 
to farm households by approximately +22,702 
EUR (Table 21c).
The above results show also that an extension 
of the AFP programme to other non-beneficiaries 
(ATNT) would result in positive leverage effects 
(inducement of private spending among non-
beneficiaries), i.e. an increase in money 
transfers from farm to farm household for living 
by approximately +369 EUR per farm (ATNT in 
Table 22a); an increase in money transfers from 
farm to farm household for building of private 
assets by approximately +1,909 EUR per farm 
(ATNT in Table 22b); and an increase in total 
money transfers from farm to farm households 
by approximately +9,555 EUR (ATNT in Table 
22c). The leverage effects on a randomly selected 
agricultural farm, i.e. ATE (from a set consisting of 
programme beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries) 
would also be positive: i.e. respective additional 
money transfers from farms to farm households 
would be as follows: +928 EUR per farm for 
money transfers for living, +2900 EUR per farm 
for money transfers for building of private assets, 
and +11265 EUR per farm for total transfers 
(ATE’s in respective tables 22 a- 22c). 
11.4.4.5.2. Effects of the AFP programme on 
farm profits
The application of the PSM methodology 
(conditional ATT-DID) to the assessment of the 
direct effects of the AFP programme on programme 
beneficiaries (re-estimated results) shows the positive 
impact of the programme on both the standard 
profit (ATT-DID = +9,285 EUR per farm, see: Table 
23a) as well as the corrected profit achieved by 
farms supported by the programme (ATT-DID = 
6,455 EUR per farm, see: Table 23b). Should the 
AFP programme be extended to non-programme 
beneficiaries its effect (ATNT-DID) would also be 
positive (+7,634 EUR increase in profits and +9,084 
EUR increase in case of corrected profits). The same 
is also true for the average treatment effects (ATE-
DID). The effect of the AFP programme measured 
in terms of ATE-DID on profits and corrected profits 
was found to be positive (+ 7,848 EUR and + 8,743 
EUR respectively). 
Table 22c. Re-estimated leverage effects in AFP programme (Schleswig-Holstein). Result indicator: Total 
money transfer from farm to farm household 
Calculation basis
Total money transfers from farm to farm household 
2001 2007 D I D (2007-2001)
Unmatched  P=1 ( 101 ) 75,415 137,886 62,471
Unmatched P=0 ( 706 ) 61,205 94,034 32,829
Average Ø ( 807) 62,984 99,523 36,539
Difference (1-0) 14,210 43,851 29,641
Difference (1- Ø) 12,431 28,363 25,932
Matched M=1 ( 99) 75,596 138,009 62,413
Matched M=0 ( 662) 71,449 111,160 39,711
ATT 4,146 26,848 22,702
 ATNT -2,602 6,953 9,555
ATE -1,724 9,541 11,265
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11.4.4.5.3. Effects of the AFP programme on 
own capital formation49 
An important variable showing economic 
performance of agricultural farming (including 
farm and household) is the increase in the 
value in own economic assets (including farm 
and household) which is measured in terms of 
current profits + deposits in farm + net transfers 
for building of private assets. It may be expected 
that an important long-term goal of farming (in 
the case of presence of a farm successor) is to 
increase this variable over the years. As public 
support provided to the agricultural sector, inter 
49 (Ger): „Bereinigte Eigenkapitalbildung“
alia, aims to strengthen the economic viability of 
agricultural enterprises, it may be expected that 
a relative increase of the value of own economic 
assets in farms receiving public support should 
be higher than in non-supported enterprises. 
Unfortunately, our results cannot confirm these 
expectations. Indeed, the value of own economic 
assets in farms supported by the AFP programme 
increased over the period 2001-2007 by +35,809 
EUR per farm, i.e. it grew by less than in similar 
agricultural farms that did not receive any support 
from the AFP programme (the value of economic 
assets in the control group of agricultural farms 
increased by +37,045 EUR per farm). This implies 
that the effect of the AFP programme on this 
specific variable was negative (-1,237 EUR per 
farm, see Table 24). 
Table 23 a. Standard profit  per farm (profit)
Calculation basis
Profits per farm in EUR
2001 2007 D I D (2007-2001)
Unmatched P=1 ( 101 ) 54,629 116,777 62,148
Unmatched P=0 ( 706 ) 40,518 82,983 42,465
Average Ø ( 807) 42,284 87,213 44,929
Difference (1-0) 14,111 33,793 19,682
Difference (1- Ø) 12,345 29,564 17,219
Matched M=1 ( 99) 54,634 115,908 61,274
Matched M=0 ( 662) 52,292 104,281 51,989
ATT 2,341 11,626 9,285
 ATNT 2,032 9,666 7,634
ATE 2,073 9,921 7,848
Table 23 b. Corrected profit per farms (profit_corr)
Calculation basis
Corrected profits per farm in EUR
2001 2007 D I D (2007-2001)
Unmatched  P=1 ( 101 ) 35,728 97,243 61,515
Unmatched P=0 ( 706 ) 23,888 67,771 43,883
Average Ø ( 807) 25,370 71,459 46,089
Difference (1-0) 11,839 29,472 17,633
Difference (1- Ø) 10,358 25,784 15,426
Matched M=1 ( 99) 35,854 96,354 60,500
Matched M=0 ( 662) 34,159 88,204 54,045
ATT 1,695 8,150 6,455
 ATNT 3,553 12,637 9,084
ATE 3,311 12,053 8,743
75
C
ou
nt
er
fa
ct
ua
l i
m
pa
ct
 e
va
lu
at
io
n 
of
 E
U
 r
ur
al
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t p
ro
gr
am
m
es
 -
 P
ro
pe
ns
ity
 S
co
re
 M
at
ch
in
g 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
...
Our results differ significantly from those 
obtained by using traditional evaluation methods 
(a qualitative difference), see Table 24. For 
example, a naïve before-after estimator shows an 
increase of the net value of economic assets by 
+ 39.997 EUR per farm; the comparison of farms 
supported by the programme with all other farms 
non-supported from the programme DID in (1-
0) shows also a positive effect of the programme 
(+10,322 EUR per farm), and a similar outcome 
would be obtained if programme beneficiaries 
were compared with a country’s average (+9,030 
EUR per farm). Obviously, the economic 
performance of programme beneficiaries differed 
significantly from the economic performance 
of programme non-beneficiaries and from the 
country’s average. Thus, the application of more 
sophisticated matching techniques for derivation 
of relevant counterfactuals is here fully justifiable. 
11.4.4.5.4. Effects of the AFP programme on 
milk production
Our results show that the AFP programme 
significantly contributed to an increase in milk 
production among programme beneficiaries, i.e. 
+ 61,276 litres per farm (see table 25). Indeed, 
due to the AFP programme milk production 
increased in the examined period in the group of 
the matched programme beneficiaries by 155,413 
Table 24. Schleswig-Holstein. Effects of the AFP programme on the value of economic assets (2001-2007).
Calculation basis
Increase of the value of economic assets
2001 2007 D I D (2007-2001)
Unmatched  P=1 ( 101 ) 4817 41814 36997
Unmatched P=0 ( 706 ) 2168 28842 26674
Average Ø ( 807) 2499 30466 27967
Difference (1-0) 2649 12971 10322
Difference (1- Ø) 2318 11348 9030
Matched M=1 ( 99) 4847 40656 35809
Matched M=0 ( 662) 6284 43329 37045
ATT -1436 -2673 -1237
 ATNT 5304 7347 2043
ATE 4427 6043 1616
Table 25. Schleswig-Holstein. Effect of the AFP programme on milk production (years 2001-2007)
Calculation basis milk production
2001 2007 D I D (2007-2001)
Unmatched  P=1 ( 101 ) 530973 692428 161455
Unmatched P=0 ( 706 ) 407068 478612 71544
Average Ø ( 807) 422575 505372 82797
Difference (1-0) 123904 2132816 89912
Difference (1- Ø) 108298 187056 78658
Matched M=1 ( 99) 526623 682036 155413
Matched M=0 ( 662) 514333 608470 94137
ATT 12290 73566 61276
 ATNT 15949 83232 67283
ATE 15473 81974 66501
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litres (by 29.5%) while in the control group (i.e. 
matched non-beneficiaries) it grew by only 94,137 
litres per farm (by 18.3 %). Also an extension 
of the AFP programme to non-supported farms 
would lead to a significant increase in their milk 
production (+67,282 l per farm). Furthermore, the 
estimated ATE effect of the AFP programme on 
milk production was also found to be positive.
11.4.4.5.5. Effects of the AFP programme on 
farm employment
Our results show that the AFP programme 
had only a marginal positive impact on farm 
employment. In the examined period total farm 
employment (family and hired labour expressed 
in full-time equivalents, FTE) on farms that were 
programme beneficiaries increased by 0.103 
FTE (from 1.752 FTE to 1.855 FTE per farm, see 
Table 26) while in comparable farms which did 
not receive support from the AFP programme it 
grew by 0.093 FTEs (from 1.732 to 1.825 FTE per 
farm). Furthermore, should the AFP programme 
be extended to other farms (non-beneficiaries) 
programme participation would bring about a 
reduction of employment (by -0.054 FTE). Also 
the ATE effects on farm employment were found 
to be negative.
Table 26. Schleswig-Holstein. Effect of the AFP programme on farm employment (years 2001-2007)
Calculation basis
Farm employment
2001 2007 D I D (2007-2001)
Unmatched  P=1 ( 101 ) 1.746 1.852 0.106
Unmatched P=0 ( 706 ) 1.742 1.787 0.045
Average Ø ( 807) 1.743 1.795 0.052
Difference (1-0) 0.003 0.064 0.061
Difference (1- Ø) 0.003 0.057 0.054
Matched M=1 ( 99) 1.752 1.855 0.103
Matched M=0 ( 662) 1.732 1.825 0.093
ATT 0.019 0.029 0.010
ATNT -0.0005 -0.054 -0.054
ATE 0.002 -0.043 -0.045
11.4.4.5.6. Effects of the AFP programme on 
labour productivity at the farm level
Labour productivity at farm level was 
measured using the following result indicators:
•	 Standard profit per total fully employed 
persons (profit/person in EUR/FTE)
•	 Standard profit per family labour (profit/
family labour in EUR/FTE)
•	 Corrected profit per total fully employed 
persons (profit/person in EUR/FTE)
•	 Corrected profit per family labour (profit/
family labour in EUR/FTE)
•	 Extended profit per total labour employed 
measured in terms of (standard profit + 
wages/salaries paid for hired labour)/total 
labour employed on farm (EUR/FTE)
•	 Production of milk/beef per a fully employed 
person (production value/person in EUR/FTE)
Our results show that the AFP programme 
had a positive impact on labour productivity on 
direct programme beneficiary farms, irrespective 
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of the applied productivity measure. In all six 
cases (i.e. various productivity measures) the 
estimated ATT-DIDs appeared to be positive, 
i.e. productivity measures in the group of 
programme beneficiaries increased over-
proportionally compared to the control group 
of farms (see: Tables 27a-27f). Furthermore, 
should the AFP programme be extended to also 
include other programme non-beneficiaries, 
the AFP programme would be found to have a 
positive impact on labour productivity in these 
farms, irrespective of the applied productivity 
measure. While both ATT-DID and ATNT-DID 
were found to be positive the average effect 
of the AFP programme (ATE-DID) was also 
positive. 
Table 27a. Schleswig-Holstein. Effect of the AFP programme on labour productivity measured in terms of 
profits per total employed (years 2001-2007)
Calculation basis
Profits per total employed
2001 2007 D I D (2007-2001)
Unmatched  P=1 ( 101 ) 34021 64754 30733
Unmatched P=0 ( 706 ) 24977 49139 24162
Average Ø ( 807) 26109 51093 24984
Difference (1-0) 9043 15615 6572
Difference (1- Ø) 7912 13661 5749
Matched M=1 ( 99) 33944 63992 30048
Matched M=0 ( 662) 34354 62868 28514
ATT -410 1123 1533
ATNT 1523 5615 4092
ATE 1271 5030 3759
Table 27b. Schleswig-Holstein. Effect of the AFP programme on labour productivity measured in terms of 
profits per family labour employed (years 2001-2007)
Calculation basis
Profits per family labour employed
2001 2007 D I D (2007-2001)
Unmatched  P=1 ( 101 ) 37762 80396 42634
Unmatched P=0 ( 706 ) 27818 55950 28132
Average Ø ( 807) 29062 59010 29948
Difference (1-0) 9944 24446 14502
Difference (1- Ø) 8700 21386 12686
Matched M=1 ( 99) 37726 79792 42066
Matched M=0 ( 662) 37290 71930 34640
ATT 435 7861 7426
 ATNT 1164 8223 7059
ATE 1070 8176 7106
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.. Table 27c. Schleswig-Holstein. Effect of the AFP programme on labour productivity measured in terms of 
corrected profits per total employed (years 2001-2007)
Calculation basis
Corrected profits per total employed
2001 2007 D I D (2007-2001)
Unmatched  P=1 ( 101 ) 23060 55234 32174
Unmatched P=0 ( 706 ) 15124 40653 25529
Average Ø ( 807) 16118 42478 26360
Difference (1-0) 7935 14581 6646
Difference (1- Ø) 6942 12756 5814
Matched M=1 ( 99) 23121 54510 31389
Matched M=0 ( 662) 23000 54017 31017
ATT 121 492 371
 ATNT 2300 7235 4935
ATE 2016 6358 4342
Table 27d. Schleswig-Holstein. Effect of the AFP programme on labour productivity measured in terms of 
corrected profits per family labour employed (years 2001-2007)
Calculation basis
Corrected profits per family labour employed
2001 2007 D I D (2007-2001)
Unmatched  P=1 ( 101 ) 25460 65426 39966
Unmatched P=0 ( 706 ) 15965 45811 29846
Average Ø ( 807) 17153 48266 31113
Difference (1-0) 9494 19614 10120
Difference (1- Ø) 9307 17160 8853
Matched M=1 ( 99) 25554 64772 39218
Matched M=0 ( 662) 24923 61450 36527
ATT 631 3321 2690
 ATNT 2420 9999 7579
ATE 2187 9130 6943
Table 27 e. Schleswig-Holstein. Effect of the AFP programme on labour productivity measured in terms of 
extended profit per total farm employment (EUR/farm)
Calculation basis
Extended profit per total farm employment
2001 2007 D I D (2007-2001)
Unmatched  P=1 ( 101 ) 31499 60290 28781
Unmatched P=0 ( 706 ) 22979 45944 22965
Difference (1-0) 8520 14345 5825
Matched M=1 ( 99) 31445 59545 28100
Matched M=0 ( 662) 31933 58541 26608
ATT -487 1004 1491
 ATNT 1665 5839 4174
ATE 1385 5210 3825
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11.4.4.5.7. Re-estimated deadweight loss effect 
of the AFP programme
Deadweight loss effects were calculated by 
comparing relevant outcomes (result indicators) 
in the group of beneficiary farms with similar 
non-beneficiary farms (control group) that 
undertook in the examined period (2002-2007) 
analogous investment (i.e. modernization 
of buildings). Due to the dropping of all 
programme non-participants located in regions 
with the highest programme intensity from 
the data base, i.e. regions NF and S-F, the 
number of non-beneficiary farms remaining 
in the data base which undertook similar 
investments also changed (i.e. out of 706 non-
beneficiary farms used for re-estimation of 
direct programme effects only 161 farms could 
be used to re-estimate deadweight loss effects). 
Consequently, a different structure of the data 
base (compared data base used to derive other 
re-estimated results) necessitated a new search 
for an optimal matching algorithm and the 
performance of all other steps as described in 
section: Stage 4.
The major steps carried out to re-estimate the 
effect of the programme deadweight loss effects 
were consistent with those described under Stage 
4, and included:
•	 Selection of a new relevant matching 
algorithm. Given previously calculated 
individual propensity scores for programme 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, 
and after imposing restrictions on the 
common support region, a new relevant 
matching technique was selected (a 
truncated data base consisted of 244 
observations of which 83 observations 
were on programme beneficiaries and 
161 on programme beneficiaries). This 
was carried out using three independent 
criteria mentioned above: i) standardized 
bias (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985); ii) t–
test (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985); and iii) 
joint significance and pseudo R² (Sianesi, 
2004) by applying methodology described 
in the section: 10.4. As a result a kernel 
(normal kernel, b.w. 0.08) was found to 
be the “best” matching technique and was 
selected for calculation of the deadweight 
loss effects of the AFP programme.
•	 Statistical verification of the “similarity” 
of both groups (programme beneficiaries 
vs. control group) prior to their 
participation in the programme (e.g. by 
performing balancing property tests on the 
most important farm characteristics) was 
performed
Table 27 f. Schleswig-Holstein. Effect of the AFP programme on labour productivity measured in terms of 
production value milk and beef per total employed (years 2001-2007)
Calculation basis
Production value of milk and beef per total employed
2001 2007 D I D (2007-2001)
Unmatched  P=1 ( 101 ) 141977 198320 56343
Unmatched P=0 ( 706 ) 105289 140862 35573
Average Ø ( 807) 109880 148053 38173
Difference (1-0) 36687 57458 20771
Difference (1- Ø) 32097 50267 18170
Matched M=1 ( 99) 140245 195161 54916
Matched M=0 ( 662) 139968 185684 45716
ATT 277 9476 9199
 ATNT 8213 32380 24167
ATE 7180 29400 22220
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•	 Calculation of a change in relevant 
result indicator (value of assets) over the 
examined period in the group of programme 
beneficiaries and comparable non-
beneficiaries 
The application of the above procedure 
resulted in new estimates of the deadweight 
loss of the AFP programme. Our results show 
that the re-estimated deadweight loss effect was 
huge (close to 100%, see: Table 28). In fact, in 
the control group of the matched programme 
non-beneficiaries the value of inventories 
over the period of 2001-2007 increased over 
proportionally (i.e. by 126.8%) compared 
with the group of farms supported by the AFP 
programme (+93.2%). This means that, due 
to prevailing economic conditions affecting 
performance of all milk producers (i.e. increase in 
milk prices) similar investments in the examined 
period would have been undertaken even without 
the programme support.
11.4.4.5.8. Estimation of programme displacement 
effects
As described in Section 6.2.2. spatial 
displacement effects can generally be measured 
by applying a similar methodology to in the case 
of direct programme effects, yet comparing two 
relationships: a) the performance of programme 
supported units (j) with similar non-supported 
units (m) both located in regions characterised 
by a high programme intensity, and b) the 
performance of programme supported units 
(j) located in regions characterized by high 
programme intensity with similar non-supported 
units (k) located in regions characterised by a 
low programme intensity before and after the 
RD programme. The lack of displacement effects 
would result in similar differences in DID-ATT 
between a) and b) (i.e. location of units would 
be considered as irrelevant).50 The applicability 
of this methodology is however restricted only to 
the case of no substantial substitution effects.
In our analysis we found, however, 
considerable substitution effects in Schleswig-
Holstein regions characterized by a high intensity 
of the programme (high programme exposure). 
This means that non-supported farms in regions 
with high programme intensity were also affected 
by the AFP programme. The basic methodological 
problem arises from the fact that a shift of 
employment from non-supported farms in regions 
with a low programme intensity could take place 
both to programme supported farms (in regions 
with high programme intensity) as well as to 
non-supported but programme affected farms (in 
regions with high programme intensity).
 
50 Generally speaking, and assuming no other general 
equilibrium effects (e.g. substitution effects), the bigger the 
difference in DID-ATT between both groups (j-k) and (j-m) 
after the programme is (the result of a shift of employment 
and a “shift” of GVA from units k to units j and m), the 
higher is the probability that the better performance of 
units j and m located in area aj occurred at detriment of 
units k located in non-supported areas ai.
Table 28. Re-estimated deadweight loss effects of AFP programme on milk farms (Schleswig-Holstein, 
Germany) 
Calculation basis
Value of inventories in EUR
2001 2007 DID (2001-2007)
Participants (P=1) (83) 80,058 153,545 73,487
Non-participants (P=0) (161) 51,607 107,265 55,658
Matched participants (M=1) 
(78) 
77,609 149,938 72,329 (+93.2%)
Matched non-participants 
(M=0) (155)
56,704 128,643 71,939 (+126.8%)
Deadweight loss (M) 99%
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The analysis of the displacement effect of the 
AFP programme in regions with high programme 
intensity (548 observations of which 59 were 
programme beneficiaries and 489 were programme 
non-beneficiaries) was carried out by implementing 
all steps described in Stage 1 applied to observations 
on farms located in these two regions only (i.e. 
NF and S-F). The estimation procedure lead to the 
selection of 55 programme beneficiaries and 359 
similar programme non-beneficiaries). The effects 
on employment per farm are shown in Table 29.
The results (Table 29) show that in regions 
with the highest programme exposure, i.e. NF and 
S-H the employment per farm in the examined 
period (2002-2007) increased in programme 
non-beneficiary farms more (i.e. by 0.145 FTE 
units per farm) than in farms which were direct 
programme beneficiaries (i.e. 0.135 FTE units per 
farm), i.e. the direct effect of the AFP programme 
on the employment was negative. The comparison 
of these results with the effects of the AFP 
programme on employment per farm calculated 
without non-beneficiary farms located in regions 
with the highest programme intensity shows that 
employment on non-beneficiary farms located 
in other regions (i.e. low programme intensity) 
increased at a lower rate (i.e. +0.093 FTE per 
farm) than employment in the group of direct 
programme beneficiaries located in regions with 
the highest programme support (i.e. +0.135 FTE 
per farm, see Table 29) as well as in the group of 
programme non-beneficiaries located in regions 
with the highest programme support (i.e. +0.145 
FTE per farm, see Table 29). This may imply that 
a part of employment in the group of farm non-
beneficiaries in regions characterized by a low 
programme intensity “went” to farms (direct 
programme beneficiaries as well as programme 
non-beneficiaries) located in the regions with the 
highest programme exposure, i.e. thus indicating 
slight programme displacement effects. 
Table 29. Schleswig-Holstein. Estimated effects of the AFP programme on employment per farm
Change on employment per farm in 
regions with the highest programme intensity 
(NF and S-H)
in FTE units
Change on employment per farm
 without non-beneficiary farms located in 
regions with the highest programme intensity
in FTE units
Calculation 
basis
2001 2007
D I D
(2007 - 2001)
Calculation 
basis
2001 2007
D I D (2007 - 
2001)
Unmatched 
1(59)
1.638 1.763 0.125
Unmatched 1 
(101)
1.746 1.852 0.106
Unmatched 0 
(489)
1.591 1.678 0.087
Unmatched 0 
(706)
1.742 1.787 0.045
Ø ( 548 ) 1.585 1.669 0.084 Ø (807) 1.743 1.795 0.052
Difference 
(1-0)
0.046 0.084 0.038
Difference 
(1-0)
0.003 0.064 0.061
Difference 
(1-Ø)
0.053 0.094 0.041
Difference 
(1- Ø)
0.003 0.057 0.054
Matched M1 
(55)
1.598 1.733 0.135
Matched M1 
(99)
1.752 1.855 0.103
Matched M 0 
(359)
1.600 1.745 0.145
Matched M 0 
(662)
1.732 1.825 0.093
ATT -0.002 -0.012 -0.010 ATT 0.019 0.029 0.010
ATNT -0.088 -0.112 -0.024 ATNT -0.0005 -0.054 -0.054
ATE -0.076 -0.099 -0.023 ATE 0.002 -0.043 -0.045
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11.5. Sensitivity of obtained results
Sensitivity analysis was carried out using the 
Rosenbaum bounding approach methodology 
described in Chapter: 5.6. The results show that 
the estimated effects of the AFP programme 
(Schleswig-Holstein) appeared to be rather 
sensitive. For example, in the case of the estimated 
effect of the AFP programme on milk production, 
the performed sensitivity analysis shows that a 
presence of a hidden bias of the magnitude of 
5-10%, i.e. increasing the odds ratio from 1 to 1.05-
1.10, would make the obtained results statistically 
insignificant. The relatively high sensitivity of the 
obtained results could have been caused by a 
relatively small number of observations used in 
these tests (99 matched pairs). Yet, sensitivity tests 
provide only additional information regarding 
effects’ stability and do not question the overall 
validity of the obtained results.
Table 30. Rosenbaum bounds for milk production (2007) (N = 99 matched pairs) 
Gamma sig+ sig- t-hat+ t-hat- CI+ CI-
1 0.069919 0.069919 38323.8 38323.8 -12675.9 100171
1.05 0.102743 0.045745 32667.5 45247.6 -16715 105753
1.1 0.143156 0.029386 26535.7 50671.1 -23047.3 111138
1.15 0.190558 0.018573 20494.7 56804.8 -28464.2 118174
1.2 0.243857 0.01157 15767.1 63806.7 -32436.1 123938
1.25 0.301608 0.007115 11303.5 69335.3 -36879 129455
1.3 0.362176 0.004325 7544.93 74078.8 -42561.2 135367
1.35 0.423889 0.002602 4106.96 78950.9 -47675.1 140823
1.4 0.485175 0.001551 837.711 83388.3 -51330.1 146999
1.45 0.544657 0.000916 -3441.52 87391.5 -55648 151453
1.5 0.601211 0.000537 -7664.68 91732.8 -59843.9 156474
2 0.931652 1.90E-06 -35916 128711 -94189.1 207359
2.05 0.944644 1.10E-06 -38844.5 131215 -98107.4 212718
2.2 0.971403 1.80E-07 -48006.8 141362 -105729 226869
2.5 0.993121 5.00E-09 -62006 158358 -117343 246818
2.55 0.994635 2.70E-09 -65351 161662 -119505 249272
2.95 0.999327 2.00E-11 -79927.9 183363 -134223 277348
3 0.999486 1.10E-11 -81039.1 187673 -137031 280889
* gamma - log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors
sig+ - upper bound significance level
sig- - lower bound significance level
t-hat+ - upper bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate
t-hat- - lower bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate
CI+ - upper bound confidence interval (a= .95)
CI- - lower bound confidence interval (a= .95).
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...12. Conclusions 
The main objective of this study was to show 
how various micro-economic direct/indirect 
effects (e.g. deadweight loss, leverage effects, 
etc.) and selected general equilibrium effects 
(e.g. substitution and displacement effects) of 
EU RD programmes can be calculated using 
recently developed advanced econometric semi-
parametric evaluation methodologies. Answers 
to EU Common Evaluation Questions (CEQ) 
regarding the effects of an RD programme on 
programme beneficiaries at farm level (including 
deadweight loss and leverage effects) were 
provided by comparing changes in specific 
result indicators collected at a farm level (e.g. 
profits, employment, gross-value added, labour 
productivity, etc.) in the group of programme 
beneficiaries with an appropriately selected 
control group (counterfactual analysis - based 
on matching). Direct programme effects were 
calculated on the basis of Average Treatment 
on Treated (ATT) indicators (for programme 
beneficiaries), Average Treatment Effects on Non-
Treated (ATNT) indicators (for programme non-
beneficiaries) and Average Treatment Effects (for 
both groups) using a combination of propensity 
score matching (PSM) and difference in differences 
(DID) methods. A modification of combined 
propensity score and difference in differences 
methodology (modified PSM-DID) was applied 
to derive various general equilibrium effects (e.g. 
substitution effects). The empirical analysis was 
focused on evaluation of effects of the SAPARD 
programme in Slovakia (years 2002-2005) and 
the Agrarinvestitionsförderungsprogramm (AFP) 
in Schleswig Holstein, Germany (2000-2006) 
using micro-economic data (balanced panels) 
of bookkeeping farms (including programme 
participants and non-participants) in respective 
countries. The methodology described in this 
study appeared as highly applicable to estimation 
of impacts of EU RD programmes. Using 
combination of propensity score matching with 
difference in differences estimator (PSM-DID) 
as the basic evaluation technique improved 
significantly representativeness of control groups 
and allowed to estimate much more precisely the 
direct, and indirect (general equilibrium) effects 
of a given RD programme. Our results show 
significant differences in estimated effects of a 
given RD programme in dependence on whether 
traditional (naïve techniques) or advanced 
evaluation methods were applied. Comparisons 
of advanced ex post impact evaluation methods 
(e.g. combined propensity score matching and 
difference in differences estimator) with numerous 
traditional approaches (e.g. “naïve” techniques: 
before-after, or all participants vs. all non-
participants, etc.) clearly demonstrate that “naïve” 
evaluation techniques usually lead to biased 
policy conclusions, irrespectively on the selected 
result indicator. Clearly, application of advanced 
evaluation methodologies can lead to quite 
different (compared with traditional techniques), 
yet more reliable results. On the other side, the 
use of more sophisticated evaluation techniques 
is especially demanding in terms of data (number 
of observations and quality) but it requires also 
more technical skills and extensive capacity 
building on side of programme evaluators. 
While quantitative methods are advantageous for 
estimating and comparing net-impacts of various 
RD programmes they should be complemented 
with qualitative methods that are very helpful to 
answer questions: WHY? these effects occurred/
not occurred in a given magnitude. A right 
combination of those both approaches appears 
therefore decisive for improving the quality of 
evaluation studies. 
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